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Japanese deals are back.  During the so-called “lost decade” of the 1990s when 
Japanese banks were saddled with non-performing loans and Japanese companies posted 
minimal earnings growth, it seemed as if the Japanese economy was left out of the 
globalization trend that was sweeping across the Western economies and much of the 
developing world.  Perhaps lost in the shuffle of the tech boom, the fallout from Enron 
and Worldcom, the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley and the subsequent rules issued by 
securities regulators, the investigations of New York Attorney General Spitzer and the 
SEC into the recommendations of securities analysts and market timing abuses by certain 
mutual funds, on top of the grave concerns raised in a post September 11th world, there 
was little time left to discuss the critical changes which were taking place in world’s 
second largest economy.  Although some companies and investors took another look at 
Japan somewhat earlier in the business cycle (and have consequently reaped the benefits 
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of such investments), only recently have the numbers come back to generate renewed 
interest across the market.
The numbers have come back big.  According to Thomson Financial, in 2005 the 
total number of Japanese deals was 2,552—second only to the U.S.—resulting in total 
deal volume exceeding $167 billion—third in the world following the U.S. and U.K.2
Japanese deals are up 109.2% in 2005 from their 2004 levels, while the U.S. and U.K. 
were at 33.3% and 15.6%, respectively.  Granted, while Japanese deals may still account 
for a smaller percentage of the overall Japanese economy when measured against 
comparable figures in many Western economies, there is little doubt that the trends are 
up.  Indeed, Thomson concluded that “Japan proved a hot market in 2005, far outpacing 
growth in the US, UK, and Australia.”3
The reasons for these developments are many, and include the decrease in cross-
shareholdings between Japanese companies, an increase in shareholder activism as 
represented by notable market players, and simple business fundamentals that made 
doing a deal much more attractive than may have been the case only a few years earlier.  
In addition to these market developments, Japan has experienced tremendous changes to 
the legal profession itself, such as the establishment of a law school system modeled on 
2 See Thomson Financial, Mergers & Acquisition Review Fourth Quarter 2005, at 3, http://www. 
thomson.com/cms/assets/pdfs/financial/league_table/mergers_and_acquisitions/4Q2005/4Q05_MA 
_Financial_Advisory.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
3 Id. at 29.
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the U.S. to train the next generation of Japanese attorneys (bengoshi),4 as well as recent 
amendments to the Japanese Federation of Bar Association rules which now permit 
bengoshi and foreign attorneys to partner up to a certain extent.5  Other notable 
developments in the M&A practice in Japan include:
• An increase in the hostile or contested deal.  While still relatively small 
compared to the historic activity in the U.S., it is no longer the case that 
every deal in Japan must be a friendly one.
• New defensive measures to combat the hostile bidder.  In the aftermath of 
the Livedoor hostile bid for Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc., Japanese 
boards have actively pursued a variety of defensive measures including the 
possible issuance of share purchase warrants (shinkabu-yoyaku-ken) which 
can operate in a manner similar to U.S.-style poison pills.6
• More competition even in the mega-deals.  The business opportunities to 
do more deals has resulted in increased competition at all levels, which 
4 See generally David A. Boling, Legal Reform in Japan, Asia Perspectives, Fall 2002, at 33-36.
5 See Gaikoku Bengoshi ni yoru Horitsujimu no Toriatsukai ni kansuru Tokubetsusochi-ho [Special 
Measures Law concerning the Handling of Legal Business by Foreign Lawyers], Law No. 66 of 1986, 
art. 2, no. 15; art, 49-3, as amended in 2003.
6 Although share purchase warrants are technically not shareholder rights plans or poison pills in the 
American sense of the term, in this article we have used such terms in cases when share purchase 
warrants are used as defensive measures since in the vernacular of practitioners in Japan there has not 
been, at least as of yet, any one label that has gained a strong and devout following.  The ambiguity in 
commonly used phrases, however, should not blur the crucial differences in law between Japanese 
and U.S. “poison pills.”
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has further highlighted the attractiveness of reaching an agreement with 
the target while adequately protecting such an agreement.  For instance, 
the recent merger between UFJ Holdings and Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial 
Group for $ 41 billion included the issuance of shares with certain veto 
rights as well as a fiduciary-out provision, both of which were firsts in 
major Japanese M&A deals.
• Greater flexibility for cross-border transactions.  Amendments to the 
Corporation Law which permit the use of certain types of triangular 
mergers have recently been enacted.  In addition, as a means of keeping 
the laws on the books up to speed with the dynamic changes in the market, 
the Japanese government has issued new guidelines on M&A defensive 
strategies.
All these changes may leave the U.S. legal practitioner somewhat perplexed as to 
where to start to learn how to get deals done in the new Japan.  A widely shared opinion 
is that Japan is currently experiencing an increase in takeover activity that is comparable 
to the heyday of U.S. takeovers during the mid to late 1980s, a time which still largely 
provides the foundation for present American takeovers jurisprudence.7  Still, while much 
7 See, e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware?  The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171 (2005).  For an interesting real-time account from the Japanese perspective 
of the events which took place in the United States during the 1980s, see NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN
[Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc.], SEC NO SUGAO [The SEC’s True Face] (Nihon Keizai Shimbun ed. 
1989).
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has changed in Japanese law and practice of late, the challenges of doing a cross-border 
deal with a Japanese company still remain.
This article examines the process which is currently being played out in Japan by: 
(i) analyzing the recent changes in Japanese law of relevance to M&A deals, (ii) 
discussing some recent contested deals in Japan that may shed some light on current 
market practices, and (iii) providing an overview of the key issues that a U.S. practitioner 
will likely face when working on a Japanese deal.  While this analysis is by no means an 
exhaustive or comprehensive treatment of the subject matter, hopefully it will provide 
some insight into the changes that are taking place in Japan while also noting some of the 
future developments that may to some degree be anticipated.
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I. Recent Changes in Japanese Law
A good starting point in better understanding the remarkable changes in the 
Japanese M&A markets is to review the recent amendments to Japanese law, certain 
policy initiatives by the functional regulators, and other guidelines issued by Japanese 
government agencies.  When taken as a whole, these reforms are substantial and may 
well be the most ambitious and far reaching in a generation.  While the specific measures 
in these reforms may not have a direct comparison to a particular event in the U.S. legal 
experience, one could reasonably characterize the reforms as representing a degree of 
change on the same level as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Fortunately for 
the U.S. practitioner, however, the Japanese reforms have been drafted with purpose of 
facilitating more cross-border deals.  Thus, at least in principle, the reforms should not 
increase the number of regulatory hurdles that a U.S. company must pass in order to enter 
the Japanese market.
A. Enactment of the New Corporation Law
The most significant of these reforms was the enactment of a new Corporation 
Law (kaisha-ho) in June 2005.  These reforms largely took effect in May 2006, except for 
certain provisions regarding possible cash-out and triangular mergers which are 
scheduled to take effect in May 2007.  The Corporation Law is the primary source of 
Japanese corporate law and may be compared to the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
although there are notable differences that must always be considered prior to entering 
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into any transaction.8  The vast majority of the changes to the Corporation Law involve 
the structuring and governance of Japanese entities, which by and large should not affect 
the legal compliance issues for a U.S. corporation.  However, where a U.S. corporation 
does business with a Japanese entity or perhaps has an interest in a Japanese company as 
part of its international operations, the amendments to the Corporation Law will have a 
significant impact.  Some of the more important changes include:
• Revision of Japanese corporate structures.  The new Corporation Law 
adopts a number of important changes to the available corporate structures 
including: (i) the introduction of limited liability partnership companies 
(godo-kaisha) modeled after LLCs in the U.S.; (ii) abolishment of limited 
liability companies typically used by small businesses (yugen-kaisha); and 
(iii) expansion of the definition of parent-subsidiary relationships from a 
straight majority of the vote test to include cases where the parent has 
control of the subsidiary.9
• Streamlining of Japanese corporate governance rules.  The new 
Corporation Law also clarifies the applicable governance requirements of 
each of these entities.  While the primary election for a joint stock 
8 For instance, the Corporation Law does not permit cash-out mergers for 90% holders of voting shares 
in the absence of a merger agreement with the target company, as is commonly the case in Delaware.  
See Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 253.
9 See Kaisha-ho [Corporate Law], Law No. 86 of 2005, art. 2, no. 3 [hereinafter Corporation Law].
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company (kabushiki kaisha) of having a corporate auditor or committee 
system will remain in effect,10 the new Corporation Law provides 
numerous changes to the applicable corporate governance rules including: 
(i) enhancing the qualification requirements of directors;11 (ii) permitting 
the creation of an accounting counselor (kaikei-sanyo) in the articles of 
incorporation of a joint stock company;12 (iii) allowing for board approval 
in writing by amending the articles of incorporation in contrast to the prior 
requirement of at least a telephone conference;13 and (iv) requiring that a 
majority vote of shareholders will dismiss a director with or without cause 
in contrast to the prior supermajority vote requirement.14
• Expansion of cash-out and triangular mergers.  The provisions to take 
effect in May 2007 will make cash-out and triangular mergers more 
available to foreign companies, which at present can engage in such 
transactions only when carried out under a special law that requires 
10 See Corporation Law, art. 326, para. 2.
11 See Corporation Law, art. 331, para. 1.
12 See Corporation Law, art. 326, para. 2.
13 See Corporation Law, art. 370.
14 See Corporation Law, art. 341. The company may still elect to increase the voting requirement to a 
supermajority by amending its articles of incorporation.  See id.
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government consent.15  The new structures will permit the surviving 
company in a statutory merger between two Japanese companies to use 
cash or stock of its non-Japanese parent company (or a combination) as 
the consideration given to the shareholders of the disappearing company.
• New limited voting right pills.  In addition to the types of poison pills 
currently available under Japanese law, the new Corporation Law permits 
Japanese companies to issue a poison pill that can limit the voting rights of 
a hostile acquirer in contrast to the customary dilution of voting power in a 
flip-in/flip-out pill in the U.S.16
B. Amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law
Separate from the new requirements of the new Corporation Law, certain 
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law17 have gone into effect or are currently 
being considered by the Japan Financial Services Agency (“FSA”), which include the 
following:
15 See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2.; Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization, 
Law No. 131 of 1999, art. 12-9, para. 1.
16 See Corporation Law, art. 108.
17 The Securities and Exchange Law was originally modeled on the U.S. federal securities laws, 
although in operation there are substantial differences between the two systems of securities 
regulation.  See generally Hiroshi Oda, JAPANESE LAW 268-271 (2d ed. 1999).
5Doing Deals in Japan.doc
• Definition of “market” trading in the tender offer rules.  These 
amendments went into effect in July 2005, and were largely in response to 
Livedoor’s purchases of Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. shares by 
means of an after hours, off-exchange trading system of Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, Inc. (the “Tokyo Stock Exchange”).18  As a general matter, the 
Japanese tender offer rules under the Securities and Exchange Law apply 
when an acquirer obtains more than one third of voting rights in the target 
company.19  Once the tender offer rules are triggered, the acquirer must 
either submit a tender offer to all shareholders or continue to obtain shares 
by market purchases.  The particular issue with the Livedoor trades was 
whether the after hours, off-exchange trades were “market” purchases that 
complied with the tender offer rules.  Since the law at that time was 
unclear on the issue, the amendments to the Securities and Exchange Law 
generally prohibited such trading in the absence of a tender offer that 
otherwise complied with the applicable rules and regulations.
• Permitted withdrawal of tender offers.  Due to the increase in hostile 
activity in Japan, the FSA is currently revisiting the possible instances 
where a hostile acquirer may withdraw a tender offer.  At present, the 
18 See Shoken- torihiki-ho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948, art. 27-2, para. 1 
[hereinafter Securities and Exchange Law].
19 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 1.
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tender offer rules do not explicitly provide that a tender offeror may 
withdraw a tender offer in response to certain defensive mechanisms, such 
as share purchase warrants and stock splits.  Since there is the expectation 
that increasing numbers of Japanese companies will adopt defensive 
measures in various forms, the FSA is currently planning to explicitly 
provide that a tender offeror may withdraw a tender offer when the board 
of the target company refuses to cancel its defensive measures.20
• Proposed changes to substantial shareholder reports.  The FSA plans to 
revise the rules for substantial shareholder reports under the Securities and 
Exchange Law, which are similar to Schedule 13D filings in the United 
States.  Under the current rules, a shareholder and its group that holds 
more than 5% of the issued shares of a Japanese company must file the 
substantial shareholder report within five business days after crossing the 
5% threshold, except for certain institutional investors which are permitted 
to file the reports in a longer period of time.  The FSA plans to shorten this 
longer period for institutional investors, although it is not certain whether 
20 See KINYUSHINGIKAI KINYUBUNKAKAI DAIICHIBUKAI [THE FIRST SECTION OF THE FINANCE DIVISION
OF THE FINANCE COUNCIL], KOKAIKAITSUKESEIDOTO WORKING GROUP HOKOKU [THE REPORT THE
WORKING GROUP CONCERNING THE TENDER OFFER AND OTHER RULES] 8 (December 16, 2005),
http://www.fsa.go.jp/singi/singi_kinyu/siryou/kinyu/dai1/tob/f-20051216-3..pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 
2006) [hereinafter THE TENDER OFFER REPORT].  Additionally, on July 22, 2005, a minister of the 
FSA orally suggested that the existing tender offer rules should be interpreted so that a tender offer 
can be withdrawn due to a stock split that would constitute a materially adversely effect with respect 
to the tender offer.  See Transcript of FSA News Conference of July 22, 2005, http://www.fsa.go.jp/
gaiyou/gaiyouj/daijin2005b/20050722-1.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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this will eventually become law as there have been objections to such 
proposals.21  Furthermore, the FSA has proposed that all substantial 
shareholder reports be filed electronically.22  A widely shared opinion is 
that these proposed changes have been partly in response to the recent 
activities of certain institutional investors.
C. Notable Guidelines and Rules
In addition to the numerous changes to Japanese law, government ministries and 
other organizations have addressed the issues raised by the recent increase in hostile deals 
through the issuance of various guidelines and rules.  While these guidelines and rules 
may not necessarily result in binding legal obligations for a company in a given case, 
they do provide important guidance as to how the legal and business communities in 
Japan are currently considering the issues associated with the increase in takeover activity.
• The Corporate Value Report.  The Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry (“METI”) established the Corporate Value Study Group, which 
was comprised by noted legal scholars and business representatives.  The 
Group considered the applicable rules on hostile deals in other 
jurisdictions, including an analysis of the rules that apply in the U.S. and 
Europe.  In May 2005, the Group issued its report on the recommended 
21 See THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 12.
22 See id.
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rules for defensive measures in Japan (the “Corporate Value Report”), 
which discussed the Delaware experience with takeovers and the Unocal
standard,23 while also observing that additional changes would be needed 
to the rules in foreign jurisdictions to comport with Japanese practices.24
In November 2005, the Group also provided a written opinion on how 
stock exchanges should treat rights plans, including the desired level of 
disclosure in such instances.  The Group stated in its written opinion that 
shares with veto rights (so-called “golden shares”) should be allowed for 
public companies under certain conditions.  For example, a company 
which issues golden shares should:  (i) establish clear exercise conditions, 
(ii) provide that such shares can be cancelled at a shareholder or board 
meeting, and (iii) limit the effective period for such shares.25
• The Defensive Measures Guidelines.  Based on the prior work contained in
the Corporate Value Report, in May 2005 METI and the Ministry of 
Justice announced guidelines regarding the preferred uses of and advised 
23 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
24 See KIGYOKACHI KENKYUKAI [Corporate Value Study Group], KIGYOKACHI HOKOKUSHO [Corporate 
Value Report] (2005) [hereinafter THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP and THE CORPORATE
VALUE REPORT, respectively], http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20050527005/3-houkokusho-honntai-
set.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
25 See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY GROUP, KOSEINA BAISHUBOEISAKU NO ARIKATA NI KANSURU
RONTENKOKAI [Disclosure of issues regarding fairness of defensive measures] 9 (2005),
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20051110002/3-ronntennkoukai-set.pdf  (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
9Doing Deals in Japan.doc
limitations to rights plans (the “Defensive Measures Guidelines”).26
While the Defensive Measures Guidelines do not have the force of law, 
given their persuasive authority most Japanese companies follow their 
mandates when designing their rights plans.
• Tokyo Stock Exchange Rules.  In March 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
made public its new rules on the permitted defensive measures of listed 
companies.27  The new rules requires sufficient disclosure of defensive 
measures and prior consultation with the Tokyo Stock Exchange.  The 
draft rules prohibited golden shares, which resulted in strong objections 
from the FSA and METI.  Thus, the new rules permit golden shares “when 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange acknowledges that the defensive measure is 
not likely to infringe the benefits of shareholders and investors in light of 
the company’s business purposes, the purpose for issuing the golden 
shares, the content of the rights, the attributes of subscribers, and other 
26 See KEIZAISANGYO-SHO[Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry] & HOMU-SHO [Ministry of 
Justice], KIGYOKACHI KABUNUSI KYODO NO RIEKI NO KAKUHO MATAWA KOJO NO TAMENO 
BAISHUBOIEISAKU NI KANSURU SHISHIN [Guideline regarding defensive measures to secure and 
increase corporate value and shareholders’ common benefits] (2005) [hereinafter THE DEFENSIVE
MEASURES GUIDELINES], available at http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20050527005/3-shishinn-honntai-
set.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
27 TOKYO STOCK EXCHANGE, BAISHUBOEISAKU NO DONYU NI KAKARU JOJOSEIDO NO SEIBITO NI 
TOMONAU KABUKENJOJOSHINSAKIJUNTO NO ICHIBUKAISEI NI TSUITE [Re: Partial Amendment of the
Stock Listing Requirements, etc. accompanying the Adjustment, etc. of the Listing System regarding 
the Adoption of Defensive Measures] (Mar. 7, 2006), http://www.tse.or.jp/guide/rule/taisho/ 
060307_a1.pdf.
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conditions of the golden shares.”28  Note that as matter of policy the New 
York Stock Exchange prohibits the issuance of golden shares by listed 
companies.29
• Pension Fund Association Guidelines.  In April 2005, the Pension Fund 
Association (kigyo nenkin kikin rengokai, formerly kosei nenkin kikin 
rengokai) announced guidelines regarding the exercise of voting rights in 
connection with proposed defensive measures (amended on April 10, 
2006).30  The Pension Fund Association represents the interests of pension 
fund participants at various Japanese companies, although it should be 
noted that there are significant differences between Japanese and U.S. 
pensions funds as a matter of practice.31  As part of these guidelines, the 
Pension Fund Association noted that it generally approves of rights plans 
provided that (i) the company in question sufficiently explains how the 
rights plan will increase corporate value, (ii) the rights plan is approved at 
28 Id. at 2.
29 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 308.00 (1999).  However, one should note that while “golden 
shares” in the U.S. or Japan may have the common element of veto rights, they may operate quite 
differently in practice.  For instance, as further discussed infra, the Class E Preferred Shares in the 
UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group merger had deal protection elements when reading 
the specific text of the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization.
30 KOSEI NENKIN KIKIN RENGOKAI [Pension Fund Association], KIGYOBAISHUBOEISAKU NI KANSURU
KABUNUSHI GIKETSUKEN KOSHI NO HANDANKIJUN [Decision Standard of Exercise of Voting Rights 
regarding Defensive Measures] (Apr. 10, 2006), 
http://www.pfa.or.jp/top/jigyou/pdf/gov_20050428.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006).
31 For instance, Japanese pension funds are not as likely to be lead plaintiffs in securities class actions or 
derivative suits in a manner that has increasingly become the norm in the United States.
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a shareholders meeting, (iii) the decision of the directors will not be 
arbitrary, and (iv) the rights plan is for a limited duration of time.  The 
guidelines also object to golden shares and dead hand poison pills.
II. Recent Contested Deals in Japan
In concert with the changes in Japanese law, we have seen an increase in the 
number of contested deals in Japan in recent years.32  While people may reasonably 
disagree as to what this means for the Japanese M&A markets as a whole, what appears 
to be beyond doubt is that the contested deal can now be proposed whereas it may have 
been merely a theoretical proposal in the past.  This past year provided the first clear 
signs that contested deals can happen with the some of the more notable examples being 
the UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group merger and the Livedoor hostile 
bid for Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc.  Given the primary importance of the facts in 
these new types of transactions, it is worth taking a moment to review the specifics of a 
few selected contested deals from 2005.
32 For this section we use the broader term “contested” deals rather than “hostile” deals since some of 
the transactions may not be properly defined as hostile.  For instance, the UFJ Holdings – Mitsubishi 
Tokyo Financial Group merger involved an unsolicited third party bid but not a tender offer or proxy 
contest.  However, for purposes of the definition of “contested” deals in this article, we do not intend 
to include those deals that are subject to a regular bidding process designed by the target company.
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A. UFJ – MTFG Merger33
The events which ultimately led to the merger of UFJ Holdings, Inc. (“UFJ 
Holdings”) with Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, Inc. (“MTFG”) actually began in the 
spring of 2004, when UFJ Holdings and its subsidiaries, UFJ Bank Limited (“UFJ Bank”) 
and UFJ Trust Bank Limited (“UFJ Trust Bank”), entered into a Basic Agreement with 
The Sumitomo Trust & Banking Co., Ltd. (“STB”).34  Signed on May 21, 2004, the Basic 
Agreement provided, inter alia, STB with the right to further discuss the possible 
acquisition of UFJ Trust Bank for a two-year period, together with a no-shop clause.  On 
July 14, 2004, however, the UFJ Group notified STB of the termination of their 
discussions under the Basic Agreement and began separate discussions with MTFG for 
the possible acquisition by MTFG of the UFJ Group’s entire business.35
On July 16, 2004, UFJ Holdings and MTFG signed a memorandum of 
understanding which provided for further discussions on a complete integration between 
their two banking groups.  That same day STB filed a preliminary injunction at the Tokyo 
33 During his secondment to Nishimura & Partners Mr. Hines participated in the firm’s representation of 
UFJ Holdings in connection with its merger discussions with MTFG.  The Nishimura team was led by 
Masakazu Iwakura, a member partner of the firm, and the firm’s negotiation team included partners 
Takefumi Sato and Hirotada Inoshita, and associates Daisuke Matsubara, Yuki Oi and Hidetoshi 
Matsumura.  However, all matters in this article are now of public record.
34 A more detailed summary of the facts leading up to the vote at the UFJ and MTFG shareholders 
meetings is available in the registration statement filed by MTFG with the Commission.  See
Amendment No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 
2005, at 63-68 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/ 
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>).
35 The UFJ Group was comprised of UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank, UFJ Trust Bank and UFJ Tsubasa 
Securities Co., Ltd.
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District Court against UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank and UFJ Trust Bank to prevent any 
further discussions with MTFG on a possible integration.  STB prevailed at the Tokyo 
District Court on July 27, 2004,36 however this ruling was later overturned on appeal 
before the Tokyo High Court on August 11, 2004.37  The Supreme Court of Japan 
affirmed the Tokyo High Court’s decision on August 30, 2004.38
On August 24, 2004, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group, Inc. (“SMFG”) made an 
unsolicited proposal to UFJ Holdings for a one-for-one stock merger which represented 
about a 30% premium to UFJ Holdings shareholders based on the share prices of the two 
companies around that time.  On September 10, 2004, MTFG, UFJ Holdings and UFJ 
Bank signed the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization which provided a 700 billion yen 
cash infusion from MTFG in consideration of certain Class E Preferred Shares of UFJ 
Bank.  These preferred shares provided MTFG with veto rights upon certain triggering 
events as set forth in the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization.39
36 See STB v. UFJ Holdings, 1708 Shoji Homu 22 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., Aug. 4, 2004).
37 See UFJ Holdings v. STB, 1708 Shoji Homu 23 (Tokyo High Ct., Aug. 11, 2004).
38 See STB v. UFJ Holdings, 1708 Shoji Homu 23 (Sup. Ct., Aug. 30, 2004). The Supreme Court ruling 
finally adjudicated STB’s claims for injunctive relief, however STB was still able to continue suit 
against UFJ Holdings, UFJ Bank and UFJ Trust Bank for monetary damages due to the alleged breach 
and termination of the Basic Agreement.  On February 13, 2006, the Tokyo District Court denied 
STB’s request for 100 billion yen in damages.  STB appealed this ruling to the Tokyo High Court on 
February 24, 2006.
39 An English summary of the Basic Agreement of Recapitalization is included the Form F-4 filing.  See
Amendment No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 
2005, at 111-113 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/ 
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>), see also Masakazu Iwakura & Yuki Oi, M&A Torihiki Keiyaku ni 
okeru Hibaishukaisha no Kabunushi no Riekihogo 3(i) [Protection of the Interests of Target Company 
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On February 18, 2005, the UFJ Group and MTFG Group40 signed an Integration 
Agreement which provided the merger ratios for the proposed integration in addition to 
the first fiduciary-out clause in the history of major Japanese M&A deals to the extent
known through publicly available sources.41  On February 25, 2005, SMFG withdrew its 
outstanding offer to UFJ Holdings for a proposed integration. On April 20, 2005, UFJ 
Holdings and MTFG signed the Merger Agreement.42  The proposed integration as set 
forth in the Merger Agreement was approved at each of the shareholders meetings of UFJ 
Holdings and MTFG in June 2005, and the merger date was October 1, 2005 for most of 
the group entities with the remaining UFJ Bank and The Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi
having a merger date of January 1, 2006. 
Shareholders in M&A Agreements 3(i)], 1747 Shoji Homu 30, 35 (2005) (discussing how the Class E 
Preferred Shares had deal protection elements such as a break-up fee whereby UFJ had a call option to 
purchase such shares at a price higher than the issuance price).
40 The MTFG Group included MTFG, The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi Limited, The Mitsubishi Trust 
and Banking Corporation, and Mitsubishi Securities, Co., Ltd.
41 An English translation of the Integration Agreement is included the Form F-4 filing.  See Amendment 
No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 2005, at A-A-1 
through A-A-21 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/ 
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>).  The fiduciary-out clause is at Section 50 of the Integration 
Agreement, and provides language that is slightly different from a “superior proposal” formulation 
that would be considered customary in U.S. public company deals.  See id. at A-A-14, A-A-15.  In 
particular, the fiduciary-out is subject to the agreement of the parties by providing, “If, as the result of 
such discussion [on the Business Integration, New Terms (if any), and Third Party Proposal], MTFG 
and UFJ Holdings reach an agreement (such agreement shall not be refused or delayed without any 
reasonable cause; and the burden of proving in advance that there is no such reasonable cause is 
placed on the Proposal Receiving Party), they may, on the agreed terms and conditions, (a) modify the 
terms and conditions of the Mergers, (b) exempt the Proposal Receiving Party from its obligations 
under this Agreement…, or (c) terminate this Agreement.”  Id. at A-A-15.
42 An English translation of the Merger Agreement is included the Form F-4 filing.  See Amendment 
No. 3 to Form F-4 of Kabushiki Kaisha Mitsubishi Tokyo Financial Group, May 18, 2005, at A-B-1 
through A-B-6 (available on EDGAR at <http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/67088/ 
000119312505110582/df4a.htm>).
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The UFJ – MTFG merger is important for numerous reasons, not least of which is 
that the combined entity MUFG is the largest Japanese financial institution and the 
largest bank in the world in terms of assets.  Beyond the business ramifications, however, 
the merger is noteworthy from the M&A practitioner’s perspective in that it involved a 
number of firsts: the first bidding war among major Japanese banks in recent memory,
the first time that shares with veto rights were used in a major Japanese M&A deal as a 
deal protection strategy, and as noted previously the first time a fiduciary-out clause was 
included in a major Japanese M&A deal to the extent publicly known.  Although it is yet 
to be seen whether such new aspects to Japanese deals will become “market” or the 
exception to existing trends and customs,43 the fact that all these firsts occurred within the 
scope of one transaction clearly suggests that Japanese M&A markets are much more 
dynamic and creative than may have been the case only a few years ago.
43 For instance, the discussion concerning the possible impact of the fiduciary-out clause in the UFJ-
MTFG Integration Agreement continues.  See Masakazu Iwakura & Yuki Oi, M&A Torihiki Keiyaku 
ni okeru Hibaishukaisha no Kabunushi no Riekihogo 3(ii) [Protection of the Interests of Target 
Company Shareholders in M&A Agreements 3(ii)], 1748 Shoji Homu 37, 40 (2005) (articulating that 
the necessity for discussions about the protection of target company shareholders’ benefits is 
increasing), see also, Robert G. DeLaMater, Director Fiduciary Duties in the Context of M&A 
Transactions:  Relevance of U.S. Experience in Japan, paper submitted at Association of the Bar of 
the City of New York symposium, M&A Transaction:  Does the U.S. Style Work in Japan?, Apr. 4, 
2005, at 18 (“Under the present state of fiduciary duty jurisprudence in Japan, the bidder and its 
counsel should consider carefully and generally seek to resist any proposal by the target to include 
fiduciary out provisions in the acquisition agreement”).  One indication that fiduciary outs may be on 
the rise is certain language contained in the Corporate Value Report and the Defensive Measures 
Guidelines which generally recommend that a target company consider possible competing proposals 
even when there is a white knight.  See THE CORPORATE VALUE REPORT, at 85 (“In the event that a 
board already decided a sale of the company and is negotiating the sale with a third party, if a 
competing hostile acquirer emerges, the board is generally required to study a competing proposal of 
such acquirer.  A measure that completely takes away the opportunity to study such proposal is 
inappropriate without any special rationale not to study such proposal.”) (emphasis added); THE
DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 4-5.
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B. Livedoor – Fuji Television
While the UFJ – MTFG represented many firsts for Japanese M&A, the Livedoor 
– Fuji Television saga is noteworthy in a different manner in that it caught the public 
imagination and was a topic of discussion in many boardroom meetings since it possibly 
signaled the beginning of the true hostile bid.  It would not be unreasonable to believe 
that executives at many public Japanese companies, witnessing the dramatic events in the 
Livedoor hostile bid unfold in the press, quickly revisited their existing defensive 
measures and contemplated possibly improving their defensive profile by issuing poison 
pills and the like.  The facts of the Livedoor hostile bid are well known in Japan and may 
not require much repeating, and thus the essential facts are as follows.
In January 2005, Fuji Television Network, Inc. ( “Fuji Television”), which held 
12.4% of shares issued by Nippon Broadcasting System, Inc. (“NBS”), launched a tender 
offer for 100% of NBS shares at 5,950 yen per share.  The tender offer represented 
approximately a 21% premium over the market price, and was launched partly because 
Fuji Television sought to rectify the situation where its de facto subsidiary, NBS, owned 
22.51% of Fuji Television issued shares.  The NBS board approved the Fuji Television 
tender offer.  During the tender offer period, Livedoor, Inc. (“Livedoor”), an internet 
business company, acquired NBS issued shares through an after-hours, off-exchange 
trading system operated by the Tokyo Stock Exchange, which resulted in its holding 
39.56% of NBS issued shares.  This system is not a fully liquid market in that the buyer 
may purchase from specific sellers on an anonymous basis to a certain extent.  Although 
17
Doing Deals in Japan.doc
the Livedoor trades were legal at the time, many observers thought that such trading 
circumvented the tender offer rules which generally require an acquirer to make a tender 
offer or purchase shares in the market after passing the one third ownership threshold for 
target shares.
On February 28, 2005, the market price of NBS shares was 6,700 yen.  In March 
2005, Fuji Television purchased NBS issued shares as a result of its tender offer, which 
resulted in its holding 36.47% of NBS issued shares.
On February 23, 2005, NBS announced that it was issuing to Fuji Television 
certain share purchase warrants44 exercisable at 5,950 yen per share.  The effect of these 
share purchase warrants was that it would give Fuji Television majority control in NBS 
and dilute Livedoor’s shareholding to less than 20%.  Livedoor brought an action to 
enjoin the issuance of the warrants, and in March 2005 prevailed at both the Tokyo 
District Court and the Tokyo High Court.45
44 Share purchase warrants are securities under Japanese law and can be issued with or without 
consideration.  See Corporation Law, art. 238, para. 1, no. 2.  In accordance with the specific terms 
and conditions of such warrants, a holder can exercise and receive additional company shares.  See
Corporation Law, art. 236, para. 1.  In this manner, share purchase warrants can serve a function 
similar to a shareholder rights plan in the United States.
45 See NBS v. Livedoor, 1728 Shoji Homu 41 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 3, 23, 2005).  Japanese courts have 
established a “primary purpose rule” whereby the issuance of equity securities can be enjoined if 
dilution of an acquirer’s shareholding ratio predominates over other reasons for such issuance.  See
KENJIRO EGASHIRA, KABUSIKI KAISHA-HO AND YUGENKAISHA-HO 587 (3d ed. 2004).  This rule can 
generally be applied in poison pill situations.  However, in its ruling the Tokyo High Court enunciated 
certain exceptions to the primary purpose rule such as greenmailing, corporate raiding, issuing 
extraordinary dividends through assets sale and so forth.  See NBS v. Livedoor, 1728 Shoji Homu 41, 
46 (Tokyo High Ct., Mar. 3, 23, 2005).  None of these exceptions were found to apply in the Livedoor 
case.  See id. at 47-49.
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By the end of March 2005, Livedoor’s shareholdings in NBS issued shares 
exceeded 50%. In April 2005, Fuji Television, NBS and Livedoor agreed to a settlement 
which had three main points.  First, NBS will become Fuji Television’s wholly owned 
subsidiary, and Fuji Television and NBS agreed to pay 6,300 yen per share to NBS 
shareholders.  This price was almost the same as or slightly higher than Livedoor’s cost 
to acquire its NBS shares.  The going private transaction closed on September 1, 2005. 
Second, Fuji Television agreed to subscribe to 12.75% of Livedoor issued shares, which 
fell just short of the 15% threshold under the applicable accounting rules that would 
trigger a partial consolidation of Livedoor.  This share subscription closed in May 2005.  
Third, Fuji Television, NBS and Livedoor agreed to discuss possible business alliances. 
The long term effects of the Livedoor hostile bid are still difficult to gauge in light 
of subsequent allegations of accounting fraud at Livedoor and certain of its affiliated 
entities.  Whether Livedoor will indeed become “Japan’s Enron”, as many have initially 
observed, will be an issue to consider in the months and years ahead.46  However, what 
can be observed with some degree of confidence at this point in time is that the Livedoor 
hostile bid dramatically increased the awareness of Japanese boards to the various legal 
issues that arise in hostile deals.  Thus, if the Livedoor cases are something akin to the 
46 At least in the United States, the more appropriate measure may be years since it is worth noting that 
the trials of top Enron executives were in full swing in 2006 while the bankruptcy was filed in 2001.
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effect that Unocal or Revlon47 had in the U.S. experience, the Livedoor cases 
substantially expanded the development of Japanese takeovers jurisprudence.
C. Yumeshin – Japan Engineering Consultants
Another important transaction for the issues it raised under Japanese law was the 
Yumeshin – Japanese Engineering Consultants deal.  Although perhaps not as well 
known as the UFJ – MTFG merger or the Livedoor hostile bid, the interplay of the 
Japanese tender offer rules with permissible defensive measures in the Yumeshin 
transaction merits its own consideration and discussion.  It all started in May 2005, when 
a financial adviser of Yumeshin Holdings Co. Ltd. (“Yumeshin”), a holding company for 
construction management and other related businesses, informed Japan Engineering 
Consultants Co., Ltd. (“JEC”), a construction consulting company, that Yumeshin sought 
to acquire additional JEC shares so that it would become a 51% owner.  At that time, 
Yumeshin held 6.83% of JEC issued shares.  On July 7, 2005, Yumeshin proposed a 
business alliance with JEC.
On July 8, 2005, JEC announced its general defense policy which provided that 
the company would exercise certain defensive measures if an acquirer began purchasing
JEC shares prior to the completion of JEC’s review of the proposed acquisition as 
presented by such acquirer.  JEC noted that such defensives measures were yet to be 
determined.  In response, on July 11, 2005, Yumeshin announced a tender offer for 
47 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985).
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46.88% of JEC issued shares at the maximum, which would result in its holding 53.71%
of JEC issued shares, at 550 yen per share.  This tender offer priced JEC shares at about a 
68% premium over the market price.
On July 18, 2005, JEC announced a stock split with one share being split into five
shares that were to be distributed to shareholders of record as of August 8, 2005—prior to
the end of Yumeshin’s tender offer period.48  The stock split was scheduled to take place 
in October 2005—after Yumeshin’s tender offer period—thus the settlement date of the 
tender offer was necessarily delayed to account for the upcoming stock split.  On July 20, 
2005, however, Yumeshin launched a tender offer at 110 yen per share, which accounted 
for the one-for-five stock split.  In addition, Yumeshin brought an action at the Tokyo 
District Court to temporarily enjoin the stock split.  On July 29, 2005, the Tokyo District 
Court denied Yumeshin’s request for a temporary injunction.49  On that same day, JEC 
48 Under the current tender offer rules, a tender offeror is generally not allowed to reduce its tender offer 
price, and it is unclear whether it may reduce its tender offer price in the case of a stock split by the 
target.  See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-6, para. 3.  Thus, JEC could have announced the 
stock split after Yumeshin launched the tender offer so that it would be uncertain as to whether 
Yumeshin could reduce its tender offer price to account for the impending stock split.  However, it 
appears that JEC announced the stock split prior to Yumeshin’s tender offer in order to avoid any 
possible confusion among JEC shareholders.
49 See Yumeshin v. JEC, 1739 Shoji Homu 100 (Tokyo Dist. Ct., July 29, 2005).  The Tokyo District 
Court noted that as general matter the board of directors of a target company may request additional 
information from a tender offeror and arrange for a discussion period in furtherance of the proper 
judgment of shareholders.  See id. at 107.  Furthermore, the court observed that a board of directors of 
a target company can take proportionate defensive measures when an acquirer does not respond to the 
target company’s reasonable requests.  See id. at 108.  Although the court suggested that JEC could 
have obtained the necessary information by responding to Yumeshin’s proposal for a possible
business alliance, it held that JEC’s stock split was not unreasonable because JEC’s stock split did not 
make Yumeshin’s tender offer impossible although it pushed back the settlement date. See id. at 108-
9. 
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announced that it planned to issu e share purchase warrants to all of its shareholders upon
shareholder approval at the upcoming annual general shareholders meeting in September
2005.  Such warrants provided that they could not be exercised by a hostile acquirer who 
held in excess of 20% of JEC issued shares.
The next development was, as might be anticipated, the entry of a white squire.  
On August 8, 2005, Eight Consultants Co., Ltd. (“Eight Consultants”) announced a
tender offer for 50.1% of JEC voting shares at the minimum at a price of 118 yen per 
share.  Eight Consultants also made public a business alliance with JEC.  The Eight 
Consultants tender offer was launched on August 9, 2005, and it was approved by the 
JEC board.  During the month of August, Yumeshin was able to purchase only about 4% 
of JEC shares.  In October 2005, Eight Consultants decreased the minimum number of 
JEC shares to be purchased in its tender offer to 20%, and ultimately purchased about 
23% of JEC issued shares.  Due to the entry of a white squire, JEC did not issue share 
purchase warrants at its annual general shareholders’ meeting in September 2005.
The Yumeshin failed tender offer provides a good example of defensive measures 
that ultimately worked.  While the Tokyo District Court did not give its definitive 
approval to JEC’s proposed stock split, in contrast to the Livedoor hostile bid the court 
did not choose to enjoin JEC’s defensive measures.  Thus, the combination of the 
announcement of a general defense policy, a proposed stock split which delayed the 
hostile tender offer, the threat of an issuance of share purchase warrants, and the entry of 
a white squire ultimately worked to defeat the Yumeshin bid.
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D. Other Notable Contested Deals
The list of recent contested deals could continue at length and provide a number 
of insights into current practices and strategies in Japanese M&A.  However, in order to 
highlight the essential points and move on to an analysis of the key issues for the U.S. 
practitioner, we have narrowed the list down to two additional deals that many will likely 
recall from this past year.
(1) Rakuten – TBS
Another hostile bid which generated a great deal of coverage in Japan was the 
Rakuten, Inc. (“Rakuten”) bid for Tokyo Broadcasting System, Inc. (“TBS”).  In October
2005, Rakuten, an internet business company, purchased 19.09% of TBS issued shares
and proposed the integration of the two companies which would create a holding 
company under which both Rakuten and TBS would become subsidiaries.50  However, 
Rakuten was not able to purchase additional TBS shares in part because TBS had already 
issued to Nikko Principal Investments Japan Inc. (“NPI”)51 certain share purchase 
warrants that would be triggered upon the hostile acquisition of more than 20% of TBS 
50 An added element to this transaction was that both parties owned professional Japanese baseball 
teams:  Rakuten with its Rakuten Eagles of Sendai in northern Japan and TBS with its Yokohama Bay 
Stars.
51 NPI is a subsidiary of Nikko Cordial Corporation, a financial services group.
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issued shares.52  The matter was ultimately resolved by Rakuten and TBS reaching a 
settlement at the end of November 2005.  The terms of the settlement provided that:  (i) 
Rakuten will withdraw its integration proposal; (ii) Rakuten and TBS will discuss 
possible business alliances until the end of March 2006 (later amended to June 2006); and 
(iii) until the end of March 2006 (later amended to June 2006), Rakuten’s holdings of 
TBS shares shall be less than 10% and any holdings in excess of such threshold shall be 
placed into a trust account.
The Rakuten hostile bid is an example of share purchase warrants that operated in 
a manner that is familiar for the U.S. practitioner.  Specifically, the warrants forced 
Rakuten to negotiate with management or roll the dice by going straight to the 
shareholders through a tender offer or proxy contest.  This is in stark contrast to the 
Livedoor hostile bid, where for the reasons noted previously Livedoor was able to acquire 
shares without negotiating with management or launching a tender offer.  A critical point 
for TBS was that its poison pill was already in place and was not contested by Rakuten in 
injunction proceedings before the Japanese courts.  On this point, the cautionary tale of 
Fuji Television’s prior difficulties was no doubt helpful to TBS in its advance preparation 
against a hostile bidder.
52 Once triggered, such share purchase warrants gave NPI a right to acquire approximately 21.2% of 
TBS issued shares at 90% of the average market price during the six months prior to the crossing of 
the 20% threshold by the hostile acquirer.
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(2) M&A Consulting – Hanshin
M&A Consulting, Inc. (“M&A Consulting”), the well known fund led by Mr. 
Yoshiaki Murakami, has been involved in a number of contested deals in recent years.53
One of the more recent deals for M&A Consulting, which also resulted in much Japanese 
press coverage, was the acquisition of shares in Hanshin Electric Railway Co., Ltd. 
(“Hanshin”).54 In September 2005, M&A Consulting announced that an affiliated entity 
held approximately 27% of Hanshin shares on a fully diluted basis.  There was no express 
consent of Hanshin.  In January 2006 these shareholdings eventually increased to a high 
of 44.49%.  Importantly, and in contrast to TBS, Hanshin did not have any share 
purchase warrants in place to deter this acquisition of shares.  Although the discussions 
between M&A Consulting and Hanshin are continuing as of March 19, 2006, what is 
clear is that in the absence of duly issued share purchase warrants a target is considerably 
more vulnerable to the acquisition of its shares by a possible hostile bidder.
53 In January 2000, M&A Consulting launched a tender offer for shares of Shoei Co., Ltd. (“Shoei”), a 
real estate business company.  However, certain major shareholders of Shoei, which together held 
more than 60% of Shoei shares, opposed the tender offer.  In addition, Shoei announced a
restructuring plan.  The tender offer failed.  In May 2002, M&A Consulting engaged in a proxy 
contest for control of Tokyo Style Co., Ltd., an apparel company.  However, M&A Consulting 
eventually lost the proxy contest.  In November 2005, M&A Consulting launched a competitive 
tender offer against a friendly tender offer by Nisshinbo Industries, Inc (“Nisshinbo”) for shares of 
New Japan Radio Co., Ltd. (“New Japan Radio”), a microwave-related product manufacturer.  The 
highest tender offer price for M&A Consulting was 950 yen per share compared to a high of 880 yen 
per share for Nisshinbo.  However, Japan Radio Co., Ltd., the parent company of New Japan Radio
which held slightly under a majority of New Japan Radio shares, accepted Nisshinbo’s tender offer.  
Consequently, the M&A Consulting tender offer failed.
54 This transaction also includes a famous Japanese professional baseball—the Hanshin Tigers.  See note 
50 supra.
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III. Key Issues for the U.S. Practitioner
Having now reviewed the recent changes in Japanese law and a few recent 
contested deals from this past year, the challenge for the U.S. practitioner is to boil down 
the complexity of Japanese M&A to a list of key issues that should be reviewed in any 
transaction which involves Japanese entities.  In reaching such a concentrated analysis, 
however, the problem with any set of action items or the like is that it cannot replace a 
thorough analysis of the variety of legal issues in different jurisdictions that will 
necessarily arise in any cross-border deal.  At the same time, in practice such lists are 
frequently helpful in organizing the various tasks and issues that must be considered.  
With these thoughts in mind, in this section we have set forth some of the main issues 
under Japanese law and U.S. securities laws that have often come into play in Japanese 
deals.
A. Structuring the Transaction under Japanese Law
Beginning with the fundamentals, there are seven basic transaction structures that 
are most often used in takeovers under the Corporation Law.  Although these structures 
may be similar to certain transactions under the Delaware General Corporation Law that 
are familiar to U.S. practitioners, it is important to remember the obvious but essential 
point—these are not your usual DGCL transactions.  In a given deal, therefore, the seven
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structures below will likely require some measure of additional time and consideration 
prior to the final determination of an appropriate transaction structure.55
(1) Stock Purchase
A simple stock purchase of public company shares through the market is one 
option to obtain control of the target.56 However, when the acquirer purchases a certain 
number of shares of a public company outside of the market, such purchases may be 
subject to the mandatory tender offer rules in Japan.57
(2) Issuance of New Shares
As a general matter under Japanese law, the board of the target public company 
can issue new shares to a third party or shareholders who seek to acquire the target public 
company, up to the authorized number of shares as set forth in such target’s articles of 
incorporation.58  However, if the subscription price for newly issued shares is deemed 
55 As is often the case, tax and accounting issues, as well as possible rights and obligations under certain 
contracts that are reviewed as part of the due diligence process, will play a large role in determining 
the appropriate structure for a Japanese deal.  These issues are beyond the intended scope of this 
article.
56 See Corporation Law, art. 127.
57 These issues are addressed in further detail in the discussion of the tender offer rules at Section 
III.B(1) infra.
58 See Corporation Law, art. 199, para. 2, and art. 201. para. 1.  Note, however, that the issuance of new 
shares is not subject to the mandatory tender offer rules. See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, 
para. 1; THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 4.
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“especially favorable”59 to the subscribing shareholders and all the outstanding 
shareholders are not entitled to subscribe for them, it will become necessary to obtain a 
supermajority vote of two-thirds or more of all voting rights (“Supermajority Vote”).60
Under Japanese law and stock exchange regulations, there is no rule that is equivalent to
the New York Stock Exchange rule that shareholder approval is required for the issuance
of 20% or more of outstanding shares.61
(3) Merger (gappei)
Japanese gappei are statutory mergers under the Corporation Law.  Similar to a 
direct proposed merger in the U.S., gappei require a negotiated merger agreement 
between the acquirer and the target company which provides that the  target company (the
disappearing company) will merge into the acquirer (the surviving company).62 In 
Japanese mergers, all assets and liabilities of the target company are transferred to the 
surviving company by operation of law, and target company shareholders receive shares 
59 Although there are no bright line rules in the Japanese cases as to what is an “especially favorable” 
issuance, in practice the subscription price per share is often regarded as “especially favorable” if it is 
less than 90% of recent average market prices. See Matsuka v. Miyairi Barubu Seisakujo (Tokyo 
Dist. Ct., June 1, 2004), summarized in Yo Ota, Miyairi Barubu no Shinkabuhakko Sashidome 
Moshitate Jiken Tokyo District Court Kettei [Ruling of Tokyo District Court regarding Claim for 
Injunction of Issuance of New Shares of Miyairi Barubu], 1702 Shoji Homu 24, 24-25 (2004).
60 More specifically, the supermajority requirement is two-thirds or more of the voting rights of 
shareholders who attend the shareholders meeting, unless the threshold is otherwise increased in the 
target’s articles of incorporation. See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2, no. 5.
61 See NYSE Listed Company Manual § 312.03(c) (2004).
62 See Corporation Law, chapter 5, subchapter 2.
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of the surviving company as consideration.63  However, under the new Corporation Law, 
target company shareholders may receive other forms of consideration such as cash and 
shares of other companies (i.e., consideration will no longer be limited to shares of the 
surviving company).64 Japanese mergers are generally subject to a Supermajority Vote at
the shareholders meeting of each of the disappearing and surviving companies.65
(4) Business Transfer (jigyo joto)
Business transfers are similar to asset sales in the United States.  They also 
require a negotiated agreement between the target company and the acquirer, with such 
agreement providing that certain assets and liabilities will be transferred from the target 
company to the acquirer.66 The transfer of contracts (including employment contracts)
generally requires the consent of the other parties to such contracts under Japanese law.
Furthermore, if the transferred assets and liabilities constitute “all or an important part” of 
the target company’s business, the business transfer in question generally requires a 
Supermajority Vote of the target company shareholders.67 In addition, if the transferred 
63 See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2(i).
64 For additional details on this point, please refer to the discussion on triangular mergers at Section 
III.C infra.
65 See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.
66 See Corporation Law, art. 467.
67 See Corporation Law, art. 467, para. 1, no. 1 and 2, and art. 309, para. 2, no. 11.  Under the new 
Corporation Law, if the book value of the transferred assets does not exceed 20% of the amount of all 
assets of the target company (with such amount calculated in accordance with an ordinance of the 
Ministry of Justice), the business transfer is not regarded as “important” unless as may otherwise be 
provided in the articles of incorporation of the target company.
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assets and liabilities constitute all of the target company’s business, the business transfer 
generally requires a Supermajority Vote of the acquirer shareholders.68
(5) Demerger (bunkatsu)
The demerger structure is in many ways similar to business transfers as discussed 
above.  There are two kinds of demergers under the Corporation Law.
(i) Absorption Demerger (kyushu bunkatsu)
Shareholders TargetCompany Shareholders
Target
Company
Absorbing
Company
Absorbing
Company
In an absorption demerger, by means of a negotiated agreement between the 
target company and the absorbing company (a) certain assets and liabilities of  the target 
company are transferred to the absorbing company and (b) the target company receives 
absorbing company shares as consideration.69 However, in the same manner as discussed 
previously with mergers, under the new Corporation Law in an absorption demerger the
68 See Corporation Law, art. 467, para. 1, no. 3, and art. 309, para. 2, no. 11.
69 See Corporation Law, art. 758, no. 4(i).
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target company may receive other forms of consideration such as cash and shares of other 
companies (i.e., consideration is no longer limited to shares of the absorbing company).70
Note, however, that the new Corporation Law does not permit such other forms of 
consideration in the second kind of demerger—the incorporation demerger.
(ii) Incorporation Demerger (shinsetsu bunkatsu)
Target
Company
Target
Company
New
Company
In an incorporation demerger, by means of  a demerger plan of the target company
(a) the target company incorporates a new company by transferring certain of its assets 
and liabilities to such new company and (b) the target company receives new company
shares as consideration.71 In both an absorption and incorporation demerger, assets and 
liabilities are generally transferred by operation of law.72 In contrast to business transfers, 
however, in both absorption and incorporation demergers the transfer of contracts 
70 See Corporation Law, art. 758, no. 4(ii)-(v).
71 See Corporation Law, art. 763, no. 6.
72 See Corporation Law, art. 759, para. 1; art. 764, para. 1.
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(including employment contracts) generally does not require the consent of the other 
parties to such contracts.73  However, both absorption and incorporation demergers 
involve certain additional disclosure requirements and mandatory procedures to protect 
creditors, which do not apply in the case of business transfers.74
A key benefit of both absorption and incorporation demergers is that any number 
of companies can jointly conduct the demerger.75  This facet of demergers make them 
attractive structures in joint ventures where each party holds a certain number of 
subsidiaries, but may wish to effect a business transfer (i.e., an asset sale) rather than a 
stock sale of one or more of the subsidiaries to be contributed to the joint venture due to 
certain business, tax, accounting or other reasons. Demergers can also be useful 
structures in LBO transactions so that the target company can demerge certain assets and 
liabilities to a new company, which will then be acquired in a stock purchase by an 
acquisition vehicle.  Such a structure may be particularly advantageous in circumstances 
where the parties seek to exclude contingent liabilities from the deal.  Finally, it should 
be noted that demergers generally require a Supermajority Vote of (a) the target company 
73 See Corporation Law, art. 759, para. 1; art. 764, para. 1.
74 See Corporation Law, art. 782; art. 791, art. 803; 811; art. 789, art. 810.
75 See EGASHIRA, at 707; Corporation Law, art. 762, para. 1.
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shareholders and absorbing company shareholders in an absorption demerger76 or (b) the 
target company shareholders in an incorporation demerger.77
(6) Stock-for-Stock Exchange (kabushiki kokan)
Shareholders Shareholders
Target
Company
Target
Company Acquirer
Shareholders Shareholders
Acquirer
An interesting structure under Japanese law that can often be used to “squeeze 
out” minority shareholders is the stock-for-stock exchange.  In a kabushiki kokan, 
pursuant to a negotiated agreement between the target company and the acquirer (a) the
acquirer acquires all of target company shares by operation of law and (b) target company 
shareholders receive acquirer shares as consideration.78 Stock-for-stock exchanges
generally require a Supermajority Vote of each of the target company and acquirer
shareholders.79  Accordingly, if one can obtain the approval of two-thirds or more of 
target shareholders (as well as of course the approval of the target board when signing the 
76 See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no.12.
77 See Corporation Law, art. 804, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no.12.
78 See Corporation Law, art. 769, para. 1.
79 See Corporation Law, art. 783, para. 1; art. 795, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.
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stock-for-stock exchange agreement), the remaining one-third of target shareholders will 
have their target shares exchanged for acquirer shares which should decrease their voting 
power on a fully diluted basis.  At the same time , however, the exchange of shares will 
effect the voting power of all the target company and acquirer shareholders because the 
total number of acquirer shares will necessarily increase as a result of the stock-for-stock 
exchange.  The new Corporation Law rules on consideration apply in stock-for-stock 
exchange transactions, and thus target company shareholders may receive other forms of 
consideration such as cash and shares of other companies (i.e., consideration is not 
limited acquirer shares).80  Such changes to Japanese law may facilitate more cash-out 
mergers of minority shareholders as is common in the United States.81
(7) Stock Transfer (kabushiki iten)
Shareholders
Target
Company
Target
Company
Shareholders
New 
Company
80 See Corporation Law, art. 768, para. 1, no. 2(ii)-(v).
81 See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 253.
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Another structure which permits the consolidation of shares, but in a manner 
distinct from stock- for-stock exchanges, is the stock transfer.  A kabushiki iten requires a 
stock transfer plan of the target company, by means of which (a) a new company will be 
incorporated, (b) the new company will acquire all of target company shares by operation 
of law, and (c) target company shareholders will receive new company shares.82  Stock 
transfers require a Supermajority Vote of the target company shareholders.83  Moreover, 
any number of companies can jointly conduct a stock transfer.84  In such joint stock 
transfers (kyodo kabushiki iten), several target companies can create a new joint holding 
company with each of the target companies becoming a wholly owned subsidiary 
thereof.85  These transactions are particularly useful when parties agree to integrate their 
businesses, but would like to keep certain operations separate as a practical matter.  Such 
a structure can also work to consolidate the shareholdings in a group of companies while 
also possibly improving the defensive profile of a company that is likely to be a target of 
a hostile bidder by correcting any distortions in such company’s shareholding 
relationships with its affiliates since it will become a wholly owned subsidiary of a new 
holding company.
82 See Corporation Law, art. 772, para. 1; art. 774, para. 1; and art. 774, para. 2.
83 See Corporation Law, art. 804, para. 1; and art. 309, para. 2, no. 12.
84 See Corporation Law, art. 772.
85 For example, on April 20, 2005, Seven-Eleven Co., Ltd., Ito-Yokado Co., Ltd., and Denny’s Japan 
Co., Ltd. announced that they would conduct a joint stock transfer, which when closed on September 
1, 2005 resulted in a $12 billion transaction.
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B. Tender Offers and Proxy Contests
A common factor among all the basic transaction structures under the Corporation 
Law discussed above is that, with the notable exception of stock purchases, they all 
require some type of negotiated agreement or plan with management.  If such 
negotiations do not result in such an agreement or plan or may be impractical as the case 
may be, Japanese law provides for tender offers in a manner that will be familiar to the 
U.S. practitioner.  The Japanese takeover bid86 rules (“TOB rules”) were modeled after 
the Williams Act and became part of the Securities and Exchange Law in 1971.87  While 
it is still relatively rare in Japan for a hostile bidder to go directly to the shareholders by 
means of a TOB, such strategies have been more aggressively pursued in recent years by 
Japanese companies (e.g., Yumeshin) and certain shareholder activists (e.g., M&A 
Consulting).  However, even in cases where an acquirer can reach an agreement with 
management, the TOB rules may still apply and thus should be an item that is included as 
part of the overall consideration of a possible transaction.
(1) TOB Rules
Many acquisitions of Japanese public companies technically begin with a tender 
offer due to the mandatory TOB rules in Japan which apply irrespective of whether a 
86 In the United States, we often refer to the “tender offer rules” under Regulations 14D and 14E of the 
Exchange Act.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 et seq.  Although Japanese securities law has historically 
referred to U.S. securities law when making new rules and regulations, in this case it appears that the 
English term “takeover bids” is the more favored expression amongst practitioners.
87 See generally THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 1.  
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specific acquisition is friendly or hostile.  As a general matter, an off-market acquisition 
of shares requires compliance with the TOB rules if (a) an acquirer group purchases more 
than five percent of the voting rights of the target company from more than ten sellers 
within a period of 60 days or (ii) an acquirer group purchases more than one third of the 
voting rights in the target company.88
Once the mandatory TOB rules are triggered, various disclosure and procedural 
requirements apply to the transaction in a manner similar to U.S. practice.  For instance, 
under the TOB rules the tender offer period must be scheduled to last between 20 
calendar days and 60 calendar days.89  There is no requirement that the tender offeror 
must purchase all outstanding shares.  Instead, the tender offeror usually sets the 
minimum and/or maximum number of shares it will purchase.90  When the shares 
tendered fall below the stated minimum, the tender offeror will not purchase any shares.  
In cases where the shares tendered exceed the stated maximum, the tender offeror 
purchases shares on a pro-rata basis.  Although the TOB rules permit the use of securities 
as consideration in tender offers, there have been relatively few instances of exchange 
88 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 1.  Note that the mandatory TOB rules do not apply 
to an issuance of new shares, mergers and stock-for-stock exchanges. See id.; THE TENDER OFFER
REPORT, at 4; NISHIMURA & PARTNERS, M&A-HO TAIZEN [Corpus Juris M&A] 59-60 (2001).
89 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 2.  The FSA has recently considered whether to 
amend the rules from calendar days to business days, although no final action has yet taken place.  See
THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 7.
90 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-13, para. 4.
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offers in Japan primarily due to the absence of tax rules which would permit tendering 
shareholders to defer their capital gains in exchange offers.91
After the launch of a tender offer, the tender offeror may withdraw the offer only 
for certain enumerated reasons as set forth in the TOB rules, such as an impending 
merger, the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings and so forth.92  Additionally, under the 
current TOB rules a tender offero r may not reduce the maximum number of shares to be 
purchased or reduce its tender offer price.  However, the FSA is considering possible 
amendments to the TOB rules which would permit a tender offeror to reduce its tender 
offer price in certain limited circumstances such as when the target company announces a 
stock split as occurred in the Yumeshin bid for JEC.93
Another important point to take away from the Yumeshin bid is that compliance 
with the applicable TOB rules is not always the end of the analysis.  As you may recall, 
91 In contrast to cash tender offers, the issuer of securities in an exchange offer in Japan may become 
subject to disclosure obligations under the Securities and Exchange Law, which are comparable to the 
registration statement requirements of the Securities Act and the continuing disclosure obligations of 
the Exchange Act.  See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-4, para. 1.  In the recent Amendment to 
the Securities and Exchange Law (which was enacted in December 2005, but will have an effective 
date prior to March 2009 as yet to be determined), non-Japanese companies may submit English-
language documents together with Japanese summaries thereof to satisfy the applicable disclosure 
requirements in certain cases. See Supplementary Provisions of Securities and Exchange Law, Law 
No. 76 of 2005, art. 1; art. 2.  These changes to Japanese securities laws are expected to ease the 
burden on non-Japanese companies that already have continuing disclosure obligations under 
Japanese law.
92 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-11, para. 1.  As noted previously, the FSA has recently 
considered expanding the list of reasons for withdrawal of tender offers in response to an increase in 
the defensive measures used by Japanese companies.  See THE TENDER OFFER REPORT, at 8-9. 
93 See id., at 9.
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in response to Yumeshin’s business alliance proposal, JEC announced a general 
defensive policy which stated that defensive measures would be taken if an acquirer 
attempted to continue purchasing shares prior to JEC’s review of any proposal submitted 
by such acquirer.  When Yumeshin launched a tender offer for JEC shares, JEC 
subsequently announced an impending stock split which had the practical effect of 
delaying the settlement date of the tender offer.  Although the legality of such a defensive 
tactic was upheld in the decision of the Tokyo District Court,94 the precise balance 
between the interests of the target company and the tender offeror will likely remain a hot 
topic in Japanese M&A law with possible amendments to the TOB rules being an 
important development to monitor in the months and years ahead.
(2) Proxy Contests
While proxy contests remain somewhat of a rare event in Japanese deals,95 they 
do still occur and thus remain a possible option for the acquirer.96  For instance, in certain 
94 See supra note 49.
95 Even in the United States, proxy contests are rare due to the effective results that can often be realized 
in a well planned tender offer.  Additionally, the high profile, costs and risks associated with staging a 
proxy contest should not be underestimated.  This said, the threat of an impending proxy contest has 
long been a possible strategy for the acquirer.  The Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal observed this 
organic and multifaceted nature to M&A strategies when noting, “[O]ur corporate law is not static.  It 
must grow and develop in response to, indeed in anticipation of, evolving concepts and needs…In 
[prior cases], the tender offer, while not an unknown device, was virtually unused with their coercive 
effects.  Then, the favored attack of a raider was stock acquisition followed by a proxy contest.  
Various defensive tactics, which provided no benefit whatever to the raider, evolved.  Thus, the use of 
corporate funds by management to counter a proxy battle was approved.”  Unocal, 493 A.2d at 957.
96 See discussion of the M&A Consulting proxy contest for control of Tokyo Style Co., Ltd. in supra
note 53.
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cases the tender offeror may also wish to engage in or threaten a possible proxy contest as 
an ancillary strategy against the target company.  Specifically, the tender offeror may 
consider a proxy contest when (a) its tender offer closes after the record date for 
shareholders who may attend the next shareholders meeting of the target company or (b) 
the tender offeror requires voting rights in excess of the stated maximum in its tender 
offer in order to obtain control of the target company (e.g., the tender offeror purchases a 
simple majority of target company shares through the tender offer, but needs a 
supermajority of voting rights at the upcoming shareholders meeting in order to defeat 
the incumbent board).
The Defensive Measures Guidelines briefly discuss these issues in noting that a 
tender offer combined with a proxy contest would enhance the efficacy of a proxy contest
to cancel a rights plan.97  In dealing with such issues, the Defensive Measures Guidelines
recommend that a rights plan be redeemed by a vote at a single shareholders meeting.98
Unlike the United States, in Japan shark repellants such as staggered boards are not as 
common a defensive strategy and thus Japanese companies should be able to follow this 
recommendation without much difficulty.99  Accordingly, for a Japanese deal only one 
97 See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 15-16.  Note that the Defensive Measures Guidelines
prohibit dead hand poison pills.  Specifically, the Defensive Measures Guidelines prohibit a rights 
plan that cannot be redeemed: (i) if one of the directors who was a director at the time of the adoption 
of such rights plan is replaced; (ii) unless a majority of directors at the time of adoption of such rights 
plan is replaced; or (iii) for a certain period of time even if a majority of the directors is replaced. See
id. 16.
98 See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 9.
99 See the discussion of staggered boards at Section III.D(2) infra.
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proxy context may be sufficient to replace incumbent directors whereas it may be 
necessary to have more than one proxy contest to take control of the board in the United 
States.
C. Triangular Mergers
As noted previously, one of the significant changes to come out of the new 
Corporation Law are the provisions dealing with the expansion of cash-out and triangular 
mergers.100  Specifically, these new provisions permit the acquirer as surviving company 
in a merger to distribute cash and/or shares of another company (e.g., a non-Japanese 
parent company of the acquirer) to the shareholders of the disappearing company.101  The 
practical effect of these amendments to the Corporation Law is that for the first time non-
Japanese entities may acquire all the shares of a Japanese public company through either 
a forward triangular merger or a de facto reverse triangular merger without government 
approval as required under Law on Special Measures for Industrial Revitalization.  
Provided below are descriptions of these two structures that one could expect to see once 
the provisions of the new Corporation Law take effect in May 2007.
100 For a more detailed analysis of the new rules relating to triangular mergers, see Takefumi Sato &
Daisuke Matsubara, Cash-out option means more M&A flexibility, The IFLR Guide to Japan 2006, 
International Financial Law Review, Jan. 2006, at 21-25.
101 See Corporation Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2; art. 768, para. 1, no. 2.  Additionally, the surviving 
entity may also distribute other assets such as share purchase warrants and bonds. See Corporation 
Law, art. 749, para. 1, no. 2; art. 768, para. 1, no. 2
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(1) Forward Triangular Merger
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The Corporation Law does not permit mergers between Japanese companies and 
non-Japanese companies and the amendments to the new Corporation Law have not 
changed these provisions.  Accordingly, in order to utilize the new rules permitting 
various forms of consideration in cross-border transactions, the non-Japanese acquirer 
must first either create or own a Japanese acquisition vehicle which will hold the cash 
and/or shares of the non-Japanese acquirer that will serve as the consideration for the 
transaction.  A forward triangular merger results when the target company merges into 
the acquisition vehicle and the non-Japanese acquirer causes such acquisition vehicle to 
distribute cash and/or the shares to the target company shareholders.
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(2) De Facto Reverse Triangular Merger
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The de facto reverse triangular merger largely resembles a forward triangular with 
the significant structural difference being that, instead of a merger of the target company 
into the acquisition vehicle as is the case in a forward triangular merger, in a de facto 
reverse triangular merger the acquisition vehicle and target company conduct a stock-for-
stock exchange whereby the acquisition vehicle acquirers all of target company shares by 
operation of law.102  Thus, the acquisition vehicle and target company will enter into a 
stock-for-stock exchange agreement which will provide that non-Japanese acquirer cash 
and/or stock will serve as the consideration for the acquisition of all target company 
shares.  As noted previously, the stock-for-stock exchange will generally require a 
Supermajority Vote of each of the acquisition vehicle and target company shareholders.  
After the completion of the stock-for-stock exchange, the target company will become a 
102 See Corporation Law, art. 767; art. 768.
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wholly owned subsidiary of the acquisition vehicle.  In order to complete the de facto 
reverse triangular merger, the acquisition vehicle will then merge into the target company, 
which will result in the target company becoming a wholly owned subsidiary of the non-
Japanese acquirer.  The primary benefits of this structure is that, similar to a reverse 
triangular merger in the United States, it will enable (i) the target company to remain the 
surviving company, (ii) the non-Japanese acquirer to own all of the target company 
shares, and (iii) target company shareholders to receive cash and/or shares of the non-
Japanese acquirer.
(3) Effective Date of the Amendments
Although the triangular merger amendments to the Corporation Law were
requested by certain Japanese business interests, the effective date for these amendments
has been delayed until May 2007, which will be precisely one year after the other 
provisions of the new Corporate Law come into effect.  However, these same triangular 
merger structures can be used prior to May 2007 in the event that the Law on Special 
Measures for Industrial Revitalization (the “Industrial Revitalization Law”) applies to the 
transaction.  The Industrial Revitalization Law, a special purpose law that is expected to 
continue for a limited period of time, is a result of the legislative initiatives of METI 
which seek to enhance the productivity of certain Japanese industries.103 In a transaction 
103 An English summary of the recent amendment of the Industrial Revitalization Law, which includes 
the provisions on triangular mergers, is available at http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/business_infra/
downloadfiles/3-4.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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subject to the Industrial Revitalization Law, the approval of a competent government 
minister is required as part of the application to be filed with the proper authorities.  This 
approval is provided under certain enumerated conditions,104 and in recent years there 
have been a number of MBO and LBO transactions which received the necessary 
approvals under the Industrial Revitalization Law.105
(4) Tax Treatment
One reason why it is anticipated that U.S. companies would prefer using a 
triangular merger structure when acquiring a Japanese company is their ability to access 
the U.S. capital markets in financing Japanese deals.106 While the triangular merger 
amendments will permit stock deals in the manner described above, at the present time 
there are no tax laws which provide incentives to non-Japanese companies along the lines 
of the tax free reorganization rules for triangular mergers that currently apply in the 
104 Among other requirements, a transaction must fall within one of the following categories in order to 
be approved:  (i) a “self-restructuring plan”, (ii) a “business transfer and restart plan”, or (iii) a “co-
restructuring plan.” Takefumi Sato & Daisuke Matsubara, Cash-out option means more M&A 
flexibility, at 23-24.
105 For instance, The Carlyle Group acquired KITO Corporation, a manufacturer of material handling 
equipment, in 2003 through an LBO which was the first cash-out merger under the Industrial 
Revitalization Law.  For a discussion of the various issues associated with going-private transactions 
under the Industrial Revitalization Law, see generally Hiroshi Uchima & Masaki Noda, Going Private 
no Hoteki Shuho to Ryuiten [Legal Structures and Issues of Going Private], 1675 Shoji Homu 81 
(2003); Tatsuya Tanigawa & Mihoko Fukuzawa, Sangyosaiseiho wo Riyoshita Going Private no 
Jitsumu [Practice of Going Private under the Industrial Revitalization Law], 1676 Shoji Homu 22 
(2003).
106 The Corporate Value Study Report noted that the aggregate amount of market capital of corporations 
listed on the first division of the Tokyo Stock Exchange is approximately $3.1 trillion (when 
assuming that one dollar is equal to 110 yen) as of August 2004, whereas the comparable figure for 
the New York Stock Exchange is $12.3 trillion as of August 2004. See THE CORPORATE VALUE 
STUDY REPORT, at 15.
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United States.107 In order to harmonize the rules on triangular mergers in the United 
States and Japan and facilitate more cross-border transactions in the future it would be 
desirable if the necessary amendments to Japanese tax laws were considered in concert 
with the scheduled changes to take effect in May 2007.  In the absence of such changes to 
Japanese tax law, the effective cost of capital in a Japanese triangular merger may be 
considerably higher than in a similar transaction that qualifies as a tax free reorganization 
in the United States.  Such increased financing costs may ultimately be shouldered by the 
surviving business and become an issue for further negotiation between the parties as the 
case may be, and thus bringing more closely together the objectives of Japanese corporate 
and tax law is a goal worth pursuing.
(5) Appraisal Rights
The new Corporation Law has also amended the provisions relating to the 
appraisal rights of shareholders in, inter alia, a merger (for forward triangular mergers) or 
a stock-for-stock exchange (for de facto reverse triangular mergers).  In particular, the 
amendments provide that the appraisal price must be a “fair price” which would include 
any synergies arising from the deal.108  Under prior law, the appraisal price did not 
107 For a discussion of the tax issues associated with transactions under the Industrial Revitalization Law, 
see Yo Ota & Tatsuya Tanigawa, Japan’s New M&A Measures Open Door for Tax Benefits, 30 Tax 
Notes International 887 (2003).
108 See Corporation Law, art. 785, para. 1; art. 797, para. 1; art. 806, para. 1.  See also Kenjiro Egashira, 
Kaisha Hosei no Gendaika ni kansuru Yokoan (V) [Commentary on Draft Outline of Modernization 
of Corporation Law System (V)], 1725 Shoji Homu 4, 9 (2005).  Precisely how a court would 
determine the value of any perceived synergies remains an unresolved issue.
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include any possible valuation effects of the merger or the stock-for-stock exchange on 
the relevant shares of the surviving company.  In contrast to Delaware,109 there is no 
market-out rule in Japan and thus appraisal rights are granted even if the stock used as 
consideration in the merger or stock-for-stock exchange is publicly traded.  Thus, future 
developments in Japanese case law concerning the appropriate methods to calculate fair 
price in the appraisal context should be a matter that is monitored on a consistent basis.
D. Defensive Measures
In response to the increase in hostile deal activity in Japan, we have seen a 
marked increase in the defensive measures being considered by Japanese companies in 
order to forestall any would be corporate raiders.  These actions by possible target 
companies began in earnest when the Livedoor hostile bid for NBS was on the front 
pages of Japanese newspapers.  In this respect, as a consequence of Livedoor, many 
Japanese companies suddenly viewed themselves as more susceptible to takeovers.  Since 
the precise extent to which Japanese companies can properly employ defensive measures 
is still an evolving area of law, we have outlined below some of the main points that can 
be observed at present.
109 See Del. Gen. Corp. Law §§ 262(b)(1), (2) (2005).
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(1) Japanese Rights Plans
The most significant new defensive measure used by Japanese companies and the 
one that has justifiably received the most attention and scrutiny is the use of rights plans, 
typically through the issuance of share purchase warrants (shinkabu-yoyaku-ken).110  The 
Defensive Measures Guidelines have provided the most recent guidance on the extent to 
which Japanese companies should be able to adopt rights plans, especially through the 
issuance of share purchase warrants, with the hope that such rules will prevail in practice 
although they do not have the force of law in a strict sense.  As a result, some Japanese 
companies have adopted rights plans under the Defensive Measures Guidelines while 
others have not.  The various legal issues concerning rights plans have been analyzed 
intensively since Livedoor case.  What we have seen is what one might expect in these 
circumstances—much variety and flexibility across the market with companies adopting 
rights plans that are tailored to address the particular issues associated with their 
businesses.  Although the specific terms and conditions of each of these rights plans may 
differ, as a legal matter the poison pills in Japan that are presently being used by target 
companies can be roughly categorized into four types, three of which involve the 
issuance of share purchase warrants.  
• Prior Warning Pills.  In this type of poison pill, as a general matter the 
target company issues a public warning by announcing that any potential
110 See note 6 supra regarding the use of the terms rights plans and poison pills in this article.
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acquirers must (i) submit certain information in order for the target 
company to evaluate their acquisition proposal and (ii) refrain from
purchasing target company shares until the evaluation of such acquisition 
proposal is reasonably completed.  In the event that the acquirer fails to 
comply with such procedures or, in some cases, the target company 
believes that the acquisition will significantly decrease corporate value, 
then the target company will take certain defensive measures.111  The 
general defensive policy announced by JEC in response to Yumeshin’s 
proposed business alliance is an example of a prior warning pill.  Prior 
warning pills are also sometimes used in conjunction with other types of 
defensive measures as part of a company’s entire defensive profile.112
111 In some cases, a target company simply announces its evaluation of an acquisition proposal and only 
asks its shareholders to reject a tender offer (i.e., the target company does not take additional
defensive measures), which remains the case as long as the acquirer complies with procedures
required by the target company.  See MATSUSHITA ELECTRIC INDUSTRIAL CO., LTD., MATSUSHITA
ANNOUNCES PLANS TO MAXIMIZE SHAREHOLDER VALUE (Apr. 28, 2005), http://panasonic.co.jp/corp/ 
news/official.data/data.dir/en050428-8/en050428-8.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
112 For example, Nippon Steel Corporation announced on March 29, 2006 that (i) it adopted a prior 
warning pill, (ii) Nippon Steel Corporation, Sumitomo Metal Industries, Ltd. and Kobe Steel, Ltd. 
signed a memorandum of understanding “which ensures the process for the three companies to 
cooperatively study the impacts on the strategic alliance and countermeasures in the event that an 
unsolicited offer is made to one of the three companies", and (iii) "the three companies have 
purchased the shares of each other.”  See NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, PROGRESS IN TIE-UP
MEASURES BY NIPPON STEEL, SUMITOMO METALS AND KOBE STEEL, AND AGREEMENT ON FURTHER 
ENHANCEMENT OF COOPERATION 1-2 (Mar. 29, 2006), http://www0.nsc.co.jp/data/ 
20060329120934.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006); NIPPON STEEL CORPORATION, NIPPON STEEL 
ANNOUNCES THE ADOPTION OF FAIR RULES FOR THE ACQUISITION OF SUBSTANTIAL SHAREHOLDINGS 
(TAKEOVER DEFENSE MEASURE) AND THE SHELF REGISTRATION OF STOCK ACQUISITION RIGHTS 1 
(Mar. 29, 2006), http://www0.nsc.co.jp/data/20060330115130.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006).
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• Trust Pills.  In the past year, a number of Japanese companies have issued 
so-called trust pills.113  The key point for trust pills is the use of an 
intermediary, usually a trust, between the issuer and the shareholders.  In 
trust pills, the target company usually issues the share purchase warrants 
to the trust without consideration and with an exercise price of nominal 
value.  Depending on the specific terms of the trust pill, upon the 
occurrence of certain trigger events (e.g., crossing a percentage ownership 
threshold by a hostile bidder) the trust will distribute the share purchase 
warrants to target company shareholders.  The hostile bidder, however, 
will not be able to exercise the warrants it receives, which results in the 
dilution effects of the poison pill.114
• Conditional Issuance Pills.  Here, instead of issuing the share purchase 
warrants without delay, the target company may conditionally resolve to 
issue (or resolve to conditionally issue) the warrants without consideration 
at a nominal price to shareholders.  This conditional resolution or issuance 
takes effect only upon the occurrence of certain triggering events as in the 
113 For example, Wood One Co., Ltd., Seino Transportation Co., Ltd., and Pentax Corporation.
114 Note that Japanese law does not permit Japanese companies to attach an option right to their shares.  
This is a critical point since share purchase warrants are not transferred upon a subsequent sale by 
shareholders of their underlying shares, while in the U.S. the rights “stick” to the shares in question.  
See generally Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 157(a).  This unique aspect of share purchase warrants poses 
numerous issues under the Corporation Law and applicable U.S. securities laws as further discussed 
infra.
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case with trust pills, with all shareholders except the hostile bidder given 
the right to exercise the warrants.
• Limited Voting Right Pills.  This pill can be adopted under the new 
Corporation Law.115 Limited voting right pills permit a company to 
convert its common shares to limited voting right shares by amending its 
articles of incorporation, and as part of such conversion the hostile 
acquirer will be excluded from voting such limited voting right shares in 
the future.
While some Japanese companies have adopted prior warning and/or trust pills, one 
should note that there were no cases where Japanese companies adopted conditional 
issuance or limited voting right pills in 2005.  Furthermore, it is anticipated that at the 
upcoming annual shareholders meetings in June 2006 more Japanese companies will 
adopt poison pills, which may serve as a barometer on the development of market 
practices.116  Thus, it appears that Japanese poison pills will continue to evolve in the 
near future and remain a matter of intense discussion among practitioners.
115 See Corporation Law, art. 322, para. 1, no. 1(ii); art. 108, para. 2, no. 3.
116 For most Japanese companies, the fiscal year ends on March 31.  As a result, the month of June is the 
most active month for shareholders meetings in Japan.
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(2) Other Notable Defensive Measures
In addition to share purchase warrants, there are other defensive measures that a 
Japanese company can take which will be familiar to the U.S. practitioner.  At the same 
time, there are certain strategies that are common in the U.S. which are not frequently 
used in Japan, and thus provided below is a description of selected defensive measures 
that do and do not work in Japanese deals.
• Dividend Increases. Japanese target companies can use dividend increases 
as a defensive measure to counter the efforts of hostile acquirers.  In cases 
where the target company can expect that an increase in dividends will 
result in a higher stock price, such a strategy may work in pushing the 
stock price above the hostile bidder’s price in the context of a tender offer.  
This approach was successfully taken in two notable deals from a few 
years ago which involved Steel Partners, the U.S. investment fund.117
117 In December 2003, Steel Partners launched a hostile tender offer for shares of Sotoh Co., Ltd. 
(“Sotoh”), a texture dyeing company.  Although a white knight launched a competing tender offer, 
Steel Partners’ final price (1,550 yen per share) was higher than that of the white knight.  In response 
to these developments, Sotoh announced that it would increase its dividend from 6.5 yen to 193.5 yen 
per share.  The market price of Sotoh shares increased from 1,590 yen to 1,800 yen per share, and 
thereafter the Steel Partners tender offer failed.  Around the same time in December 2003, Steel 
Partners launched a hostile tender offer for shares of Yushiro Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. (“Yushiro”) 
at 1,150 yen per share.  Yushiro announced that it would increase its dividend from 11 yen to 192 yen 
per share.  The market price of Yushiro shares increased to about 1,600 – 1,900 yen from a previous 
1,156 yen per share before the announcement.  The result was the same: the Steel Partners tender offer 
failed.
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• Stock splits.  As demonstrated in the Yumeshin – JEC deal, stock splits
can be effective defensive measures in tender offers by delaying the 
settlement date of the tender offer, which will make the tender offer less 
attractive to shareholders and the tender offeror.  In the case of JEC’s 
stock split, this resulted in the delay of the tender offer settlement by 56 
days.  However, as a result of recent amendments to the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange rules, the maximum delay period has effectively become 
approximately 50 days.118
• Staggered boards.  In contrast to U.S. practice, staggered boards are 
usually not an effective strategy in Japanese deals.  This is because the 
maximum term of directors is two years under Japanese law, whereas in 
Delaware the directors can be separated into three classes with three-year
terms.119 Thus, a staggered board for a Japanese company can only delay 
the hostile acquirer for approximately one year.  Additionally, the 
Defensive Measures Guidelines recommend that a company provide 
directors with one-year terms when the company in question has adopted a 
rights plan that lasts longer than one year so that shareholders can 
indirectly approve the rights plan annually when voting on the slate of 
118 See Yo Ota, Nihon Gijutsu Kaihatsu no Kabushiki Bunkatsu Sashitome Karishobun Meirei Moshitate 
Jiken [Preliminary Injunction Case of Enjoinment of Stock Split of JEC], 1742 Shoji Homu 42, 44; 52 
(2005).
119 See Corporation Law, art. 332, para. 1; Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141(d).
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directors.120  Furthermore, another reason for the ineffectiveness of 
staggered boards in Japan is that it is possible to dismiss directors at 
shareholders meetings without cause.121
• Supermajority voting requirements.  In a manner similar to staggered 
boards, the use of supermajority voting requirements are not a commonly 
used defensive strategy in Japanese deals.  Unlike in Delaware where the 
default rule is that a majority of outstanding shares can approve a merger 
although this threshold may be increased as provided in the certificate of 
incorporation,122 Japanese law generally requires a Supermajority Vote for 
mergers or other significant corporate actions.123 The new Corporation 
Law permits Japanese companies to increase this supermajority vote 
requirement by amending the articles of incorporation, but it is not 
possible to decrease the requirement to a majority of the outstanding 
shares as is the case in Delaware.124  However, one area where the new 
120 See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 9; 12; 19.
121 See Corporation Law, art. 339, para. 1; art. 339, para. 2 (indemnification may be available to a 
director who was dismissed without cause).  In Delaware, the general rule is that any director may be 
removed with or without cause, although removal without cause may not be possible in certain cases 
when the corporation has elected to classify its board or have cumulative voting.  See Del. Gen. Corp. 
Law §141(k).
122 See Del Gen. Corp. Law §§ 102(b)(4), 251(c).
123 See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2.
124 See Corporation Law, art. 309, para. 2.
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Corporation Law does provide for a simple majority vote is in the 
dismissal of directors with or without cause, which may be increased by 
amendment to the articles of incorporation.125
(3) Emerging Issues:  Special Committee of Directors
As a corollary to the increase in defensive measures employed by Japanese 
companies, an issue that has received additional attention of late is the extent to which a 
special committee of directors should be formed in order to review and consider 
proposals from hostile bidders.  In takeovers under Delaware law, special committees are 
often used when there is a question as to the independence of target company directors.  
This will often occur in going private transactions or when a controlling shareholder of 
the target is the acquirer.  In such cases, the entire fairness test as enunciated by the 
Delaware courts will most likely apply to the transaction that is subject to judicial 
review.126  The Delaware special committee process, therefore, is often used in 
furtherance of satisfying the requirements of the entire fairness test127 since a well 
125 See Corporation Law, art. 341.
126
“The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair price.  The former embraces 
questions of when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to 
the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained.  The latter 
aspect of fairness relates to the economic and financial considerations of the proposed merger, 
including all relevant factors:  assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other elements 
that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company’s stock.  However, the test for fairness is not a 
bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price.  All aspects of the issue must be examined as a 
whole since the question is one of entire fairness.”  Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 
A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994), quoting, Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983). See 
also Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 144(a)(3).
127 See id.
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planned and executed special committee process can shift the burden of proof to plaintiff 
shareholders in future litigation proceedings.128
Special committees in Japan share many of the aspects that one usually finds in a 
special committee that operates under Delaware law, with the interest of maintaining 
independence in the decision-making process playing a fundamental role.129  However, 
one key difference between current practices in Japan and Delaware is that under present 
Japanese law there are no clear prudential standards for reviewing the decisions of target 
boards.  A consequence of the continuing development of Japanese law is that the special 
committee process is evolving in parallel with the consideration of new defensive 
measures.
At the present time, special committees are most often used when a Japanese 
company adopts a rights plan.  A customary example is when, as part of the 
announcement of a rights plan, a Japanese company will require that activation and 
cancellation of the rights plan be determined by the board of directors that “assigns 
maximum value to the recommendations” of a special committee.130  In contrast to the 
128
“Particular consideration must be given to evidence of whether the special committee was truly 
independent, fully informed, and had the freedom to negotiate at arm’s length.”  Id. 638 A.2d at 1120-
1121.
129 See THE CORPORATE VALUE REPORT, at 91-94.
130 LION CORPORATION, NOTICE CONCERNING THE ISSUANCE OF SUBSCRIPTION RIGHTS IN PREPARATION
FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF A TRUST-TYPE RIGHTS PLAN, at 7 (Feb. 6, 2006), http://www.lion.co.jp/ 
en/press/html/2006009f.htm; SEINO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD., ISSUANCE OF STOCK ACQUISITION
RIGHTS FOR A TRUST-TYPE RIGHTS PLAN 10 (May 17, 2005), http://www.seino.co.jp/seino/e/news/ 
pdf/17may2005-01.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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customary practice in the United States, in Japan the members of the special committee 
are not only directors of the target company, but may also include independent statutory 
auditors or outside advisors such as legal counsel.131  The concerns related to maintaining 
the necessary independence of the special committee process are present in Japan as is 
the case in the U.S. experience,132 and such issues have resonated with investors and led 
some to vote against rights plans where the special committee was not considered 
sufficiently independent from management.133
Given this evolving nature of special committees in Japanese deals, we will likely 
see additional changes in the manner in which special committees are constituted and 
operated in the coming years.
E. U.S. Federal Securities Laws
In addition to Japanese law considerations, practitioners should keep in mind the 
possible implications of U.S. securities laws when doing Japanese deals.  In particular, 
131 See LION CORPORATION, id. at 7; SEINO TRANSPORTATION CO., LTD., id. at 9.
132 Defining “independence” is a well known issue for U.S. practitioners in complying with the new 
corporate governance rules and regulations that came into effect after the enactment of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  See 17 C.F.R. 240.10A-3; NYSE Listed Company Manual § 303A.02; NASD Manual 
Rules 4200(a)(15), 4350(c).
133 For example, it is reported that the Pension Fund Association voted against rights plans proposed by 
two companies at their respective shareholders meetings in 2005 because of their dissatisfaction with 
the independence of special committee members in one case and the authority given to the special 
committee in making decisions for the corporation in the other.  See The Yomiuri Shimbun, Poison 
Pill Donyu Hantai no Case [Cases of Objecting to the Introduction of Poison Pills], Morning Edition 
of July 7, 2005, at 9, available at http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20050707mh05.htm (last 
visited Mar. 7, 2006).
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given the globalization of both institutional and individual investment, securities of 
Japanese issuers that have never been listed on an exchange outside of Japan are 
frequently beneficially owned by persons resident in the U.S.  Thus, a deal with a 
Japanese issuer may trigger various requirements under U.S. securities laws.  This section 
provides guidance for structuring M&A transactions in compliance with U.S. securities 
laws, reviews the consequences for violating such laws, and also examines the potential 
impact of U.S. securities laws on Japanese rights plans.
(1) Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Japanese Business 
Combinations and Tender Offers 
The Securities Act of 1933 (the “Securities Act”) regulates offers and sales of 
securities in the U.S.  Pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act, issuers must file a 
registration statement in respect of securities offered and sold in the U.S. or comply with 
an exemption from the registration requirement.134  “Offer” and “sale” include proposals 
to U.S. security holders requiring a vote on whether to accept new or different securities 
in exchange for their existing securities.135  The three typical Japanese business 
combination structures (gappei or mergers, kabushiki kokan or stock-for-stock 
exchanges, and kabushiki iten or stock transfers) generally require approval by the 
shareholders who will receive new or different securities as a result of the transaction and 
134 See 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1997).
135 See § 77b(a)(3).
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are therefore subject to the Securities Act when U.S. holders are asked to vote on the 
transaction.136
Section 14(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934137 (the “Exchange Act”) and 
the rules promulgated thereunder provide detailed disclosure, procedural and filing 
requirements regarding tender offers for securities registered under the Exchange Act.  
Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act138 and the rules promulgated thereunder create 
procedural rules for all tender offers made in the U.S.  Moreover, Section 13(e) of the 
Exchange Act139 and the rules promulgated thereunder set forth additional rules 
applicable to all issuer tender offers and going private transactions conducted in the U.S.  
Any tender offer made with respect to shares held by U.S. persons or shares registered 
with the SEC must therefore comply with these requirements, as applicable, unless it falls 
within an exemption from the Exchange Act tender offer requirements.
An entity seeking to acquire the shares of a foreign private issuer140 through a 
business combination or tender offer can nonetheless avoid the requirements of the 
136 See Sections III.A.3, 6 & 7, supra, for a discussion of gappei, kabushiki kokan and kabushiki iten.  In 
the case of a cash-out merger or cash-out stock for stock exchange, the offeror does not make an offer 
or sale of securities to the target company shareholders, and the Securities Act is therefore not 
applicable.  However, note that the Corporation Law does not permit cash-out mergers in the manner 
provided under Delaware law.  See supra note 8.
137 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1997).
138 § 78n(e).
139 § 78m(e).
140 A foreign private issuer is any issuer not organized under the laws of the U.S., provided that more 
than 50 percent of its outstanding voting securities are not owned by U.S. residents and: (i) less than 
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Securities Act and Exchange Act by excluding U.S. holders from the transaction or, in 
the case of a tender offer where part of the consideration is securities (i.e., an exchange 
offer), offering U.S. holders only the cash proceeds of shares pursuant to a so-called 
vendor placement.141  As discussed below, these alternatives are frequently impractical or 
prohibited under Japanese laws.  Therefore, the Cross Border Rules which are exceptions 
to the general requirements of the Securities Act and Exchange Act,142 are the primary 
means by which U.S. shareholders can be included in Japanese tender offers and business 
combinations.143
half of the executive officers or directors of the issuer are U.S. citizens or residents; (ii) more than 50 
percent of the assets of the issuer are not located in the U.S.; or (iii) the U.S. is not the issuer’s 
primary place of business.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2004).
141 In the context of a business combination or tender offer in which securities make up part of the 
consideration, Japanese issuers could also issue shares to U.S. holders pursuant to a private placement
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act or register the shares to be issued to U.S. holders with the 
SEC.  However, a private placement is often impractical because the issuer is required to know in 
advance that all U.S. persons who receive the offer are qualified under the Securities Act to participate 
in a private placement. Registering shares with the SEC is also frequently impractical because of the 
time and expense involved and the triggering of ongoing Securities Act reporting requirements.  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the application of U.S. securities laws to non-U.S. transactions, see
Stephen D. Bohrer, The Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Overseas Business Transactions, 11 
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 126 (2005).
142 See Cross-Border Tender and Exchange Offers, Business Combinations and Rights Offerings, 
Securities Act Release No. 7759, Exchange Act Release No. 42054, 60 Fed. Reg. 61,382 (Oct. 26, 
1999) (hereinafter, the “Cross Border Release”).
143
“[T]he Commission is adopting exemptive rules that are intended to encourage issuers and bidders to 
extend tender and exchange offers . . . and business combinations to the U.S. security holders of 
foreign private issuers.”  Id. at 61,382.
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(i) Exclusion of U.S. shareholders
Offerors can avoid SEC jurisdiction over a business combination or tender offer 
by excluding U.S. holders from the offer or sale.144 Offerors’ ability to take this approach 
depends on whether, under the laws of their own jurisdictions, some shareholders may be 
excluded from the offer and whether the offeror can win approval for the transaction 
without the votes of U.S. shareholders.  This approach would also require that the 
transaction be structured and documented in a way that made it clear that no offer was 
being made in the U.S.145
The exclusion of U.S. holders is not likely to be permitted in Japanese business 
combinations because the Corporation Law requires that all shareholders of a class be 
treated equally.146  This rule is most likely interpreted to require that shareholders of a 
144 See id. at 61,383 (discussing the possibility that notwithstanding the adoption of the Cross Border 
Rules, some non-U.S. issuers will continue to exclude U.S. holders from participation in business 
combinations).
145 The Securities Act definitions of “offer to sell,” “offer for sale,” and “offer” include “every attempt or 
offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security 
or interest in a security, for value.”  § 77b(a)(3).  “Tender Offer” is not specifically defined in the 
Exchange Act or rules promulgated thereunder.  However, tender offers are generally characterized by 
eight factors: “(i) an active and widespread solicitation of public shareholders is made for shares of an 
issuer; (ii) the solicitation is made for a substantial percentage of the issuer's stock; (iii) the offer to 
purchase is made at a premium above the prevailing market price; (iv) the terms of the offer are firm 
rather than negotiable; (v) the offer is contingent on the tender of a fixed minimum number of shares 
and is often subject to a ceiling of a fixed maximum number of shares to be purchased; (vi) the offer 
is open for only a limited period of time; (vii) offerees are subject to pressure to sell their stock; and 
(viii) public announcements of an acquisition program precede or accompany the accumulation of 
stock.”  MEREDITH M. BROWN, ET AL., TAKEOVERS: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO MERGERS AND 
ACQUISITIONS § 4-2.A. (2d ed. 2004).
146 Corporation Law, art. 109, para. 1 (“A stock company must treat shareholders equally in accordance 
with content and the number of shares owned by them”).
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class be offered identical consideration in a business combination or tender offer, and not 
just consideration of equal value.
In the context of an exchange offer, to ensure that no offer is made in the U.S., 
documents concerning the transaction should not be disseminated in or otherwise sent to 
the U.S and offerors should obtain undertakings from nominees not to send any such 
documents into the U.S.  Moreover, offerors should not accept tenders from U.S. persons 
and require all tendering shareholders to certify that they did not receive any documents 
in the U.S.  Japanese registration statements announcing a cash tender offer often contain 
a legend indicating that the acquirer does not intend to make the offer in the U.S.147
However, as indicated in Section III.B.1. above, exchange offers are rare in Japan due to 
unfavorable tax treatment.  
(ii) Vendor Placements
The SEC has taken the position that if a foreign issuer offers and issues to U.S. 
residents securities as consideration in a tender offer that are immediately resold outside 
the United States for the account of the U.S. residents, there is no offer or sale made to 
147 The following is a typical legend: “Shareholders residing overseas need to offer their shares through 
their standing agents in Japan.  This tender offer does not intend to, directly or indirectly, be made in 
or towards the United States, and is not carried by use of the mails in the United States or in any other 
interstate commerce in the United States or international commerce nor by use of any facilities of a 
national securities exchange in the United Sates.”  For an analysis of the legality of such legends
under the Securities and Exchange Law, see Tatsuya Tanigawa & Mihoko Fukuzawa, Sangyosaiseiho 
wo Riyoshita Going Private no Jitsumu [Practice of Going Private under the Industrial Revitalization 
Law], at 27.
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the U.S. residents for purposes of the Securities Act.148  In such transactions, this “vendor 
placement” technique works as follows: (i) U.S. holders of target company securities 
receive the same offer as was made to all target shareholders; (ii) a U.S. holder’s 
acceptance of the offer is deemed an agreement to have the acquiring company’s shares 
that would otherwise be issued to such U.S. holder be issued instead to a trustee located 
outside the United States; (iii) upon receiving shares from the acquiring company, the 
trustee promptly resells them outside the United States; and (iv) following such resale, 
the trustee remits the cash proceeds, less expenses, to the U.S. holder.149  However, the 
SEC has permitted this approach in only limited circumstances, and has not codified the 
process, but rather signaled that it will evaluate the availability of vendor placements on a 
case by case basis.150
Vendor placements are typically not a useful means to avoid U.S. jurisdiction in 
Japanese exchange offers because under Japanese law shareholders cannot be forced to 
accept different forms of consideration in a given transaction.151 Accordingly, where a 
148 See, e.g., Singapore Telecommunications Ltd., SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 533462 (May 15, 
2001); TABCORP Holdings Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 766087 (August 27, 1999); 
Durban Roodepoort Deep, Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1999 WL 1578786 (February 23, 1999); 
AMP Limited, SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 870709 (September 17, 1998); Cross Border Release, 
at 61,386.
149 See id.
150 See Cross Border Release, at Note 38.
151 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 3.
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target company’s shares are owned by U.S. and Japanese shareholders, the acquirer is not 
permitted to offer cash to U.S. shareholders and stock to Japanese shareholders.
(2) The Cross Border Rules - Rule 802
Rule 802 of the Securities Act exempts from registration (i) exchange offers for 
the securities of foreign private issuers and (ii) exchanges of the securities of foreign 
private issuers in any business combination, provided the conditions discussed below are 
met.152
(i) 10% Ownership Test
In a gappei (merger) or kabushiki kokan (stock-for-stock exchange), less than 
10% of the security holders of the target company may be resident in the U.S.153  In a 
kabushiki iten (stock transfer), the percentage of shares held by U.S. holders for the 
purpose of determining the availability of Rule 802 should be based on the ownership of 
shares of the successor company on a pro forma basis immediately following the 
transaction.154
152 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.802 (2004).  An exchange offer is a tender offer in which securities constitute 
part of the consideration, see id. at § 230.800(c), and a business combination is “a statutory 
amalgamation, merger, arrangement or other reorganization requiring the vote of security holders of 
one or more of the participating companies.”  Id. at § 230.800(a).  As noted in Section III.B.1 supra, 
exchange offers are generally not conducted in Japan due to unfavorable tax treatment.
153 The 10% calculation is based on the specific instructions set forth in the regulations.  See § 
230.800(h).
154 See § 230.802(a).
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Securities that are convertible or exchangeable into the securities that are subject 
to the offer are excluded from the 10% ownership calculation.155  Securities owned by 
owners of more than 10% of the subject securities and securities owned by the offeror are 
also excluded from the calculation of U.S. ownership.156
The ownership calculation should be made with respect to the shareholders of 
record 30 days prior to the commencement of the offer.157  However, offerors may depart 
from the 30-day standard when they are limited in their access to security holder list 
information prepared periodically by third parties. 158  In such instances the offeror may 
determine the percentage of U.S. holders of the shares subject to the offer by reference to 
the latest security holder list available, unless the offeror has access to more accurate 
information.159  Since Japanese companies typically receive their shareholder lists from 
the depositary at fixed intervals and cannot otherwise obtain the shareholder lists unless 
undergoing a capital structure change, the companies are usually required to utilize this 
exception to the 30-day rule.
155 See § 230.802(b)(1).
156 See § 230.800(h)(2).
157 See § 230.800(h)(1).
158 See Division of Corporate Finance: Third Supplement to the Manual of Publicly Available Telephone 
Interpretations, Cross-Border Release (Supp. Jul. 2001), Part E, Question 9.
159 See id.
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In order to make the 10% ownership determination, the offeror must “look 
through” record ownership in the target company’s home jurisdiction and in the U.S. 
when the target company’s shares are held by brokers, dealers, banks or other nominees, 
and determine the number of shares held in accounts with such nominees by U.S. 
holders.160  To the extent the offeror is unable to determine beneficial ownership after a 
reasonable inquiry, it may assume that the beneficial owners of securities held by 
nominees are residents of the jurisdiction in which the nominee has its principal place of 
business.161  The reasonable inquiry standard is not defined in SEC rules or guidance.  
However, it normally requires that the offeror ask each nominee that is located in the 
target company’s home jurisdiction or the U.S. how many shares it is holding for the 
accounts of customers resident in the U.S.162
Provided not more than 10% of the target company’s securities are held by U.S. 
holders when a bidder commences an offer, a competing offeror need not abide by the 
10% U.S. ownership requirement.163  Thus, if securities move into the U.S. after the 
initial offer such that more than 10% of the securities subject to the offer are owned by 
U.S. holders, later bids are not foreclosed by the 10% ownership test.
160 See § 230.800(h)(3).
161 See § 230.800(h)(4).
162 See Equant N.V., SEC No Action Letter, 2005 WL 1173099 (April 18, 2004).  In Equant, the SEC 
approved an inquiry where the issuer retained an agent to conduct an investigation into the beneficial 
holders of the issuers’ shares.  The agent obtained a list of holders from the depositary and sent 
informational requests regarding beneficial ownership to each of the nominees on the list.  
163 See § 230.802(a); 17 C.F.R § 240.14d-1(c)(1) (2004).  See also Cross Border Release, at 61,384.
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(ii) Equal Treatment
U.S. holders must be allowed to participate in the exchange offer or business 
combination on at least an equal basis with other holders.  However, offerors are 
permitted to offer U.S. holders cash-only consideration, even when non-U.S. holders are 
offered securities, provided the offeror has a reasonable basis to believe the value of the 
cash is substantially equivalent to the value of the securities.164  Nonetheless, as noted 
previously, this exception to the Rule 802 equal treatment requirement is precluded by 
the Corporation Law.165
(iii) Documentary Requirements
An English translation of any informational document the offeror publishes or 
disseminates to the target company’s security holders in connection with the transaction 
must be furnished to the SEC on Form CB not later than the next business day following 
publication or dissemination.166  “Informational document” is not defined in the rules or 
guidance.  Relevant factors in evaluating whether a disclosure constitutes an 
informational document may include (i) whether the disclosure is required in the offeror’s 
home jurisdiction, (ii) whether it formally commences the offer, (iii) whether it is 
164 See § 230.802(a)(2).
165 See Corporation Law, art. 109, para. 1.
166 See § 230.802(a)(3).  Per Regulation S, if no offer or sale is made in the U.S. (i.e., the target company 
has no U.S. shareholders) there is no Securities Act registration requirement, and hence no need to 
comply with the Rule 802 Securities Act registration exemption.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.901 et seq.
(2004).
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addressed to security holders, (iv) whether it gives security holders the means to tender 
shares and (v) whether it otherwise gives shareholders material information about the 
offer that they have not already received.167
(iv) Parties Responsible for Filing Form CB
Pursuant to Rule 802, in an acquisition, the acquirer (or “issuer”) is required to 
furnish informational documents disseminated to the shareholders of the target (or 
“subject”) company to the SEC on Form CB.168  This allocation of responsibility is 
consistent with U.S. securities laws regarding exchange offers and business combinations 
which require an acquiring company to send the prospectus/proxy statement to target 
company shareholders.  However, in a Japanese business combination, the target 
company, rather than the acquirer, typically distributes informational documents 
concerning the transaction to its own shareholders.  
(v) Dissemination
An informational document is deemed to have been published or otherwise 
disseminated if it is made public in any manner, such as via press release, the Internet or 
direct mailing.169  Informational documents published or otherwise disseminated to 
167 See Cross Border Release, at 61,385, 61,391.
168 See § 230.802(a)(3)(i).
169 See § 230.802(a)(3)(i), (ii); Cross Border Release, at 61,391, 61,394.
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shareholders in the offeror’s home jurisdiction must be translated into English and 
disseminated to U.S. holders on a comparable basis to the means by which they were 
provided to security holders in the offeror’s home jurisdiction.170  When the offeror 
disseminates an informational document in its home jurisdiction by means of 
“publication” (e.g., a press release via media outlets or a newspaper advertisement) rather 
than sending the informational document directly to security holders, the offeror must 
publish the information in the U.S. in a manner reasonably calculated to inform U.S. 
holders of the relevant information.171  The rule does not specify what method of 
dissemination satisfies this requirement.172  However, the adopting release makes clear 
that the dissemination requirement is not satisfied by posting materials on the Internet.173
The rule does not clearly identify exactly when during the course of a transaction 
the requirement to furnish and disseminate begins and ends.  However, Japanese 
companies often file the following documents in English on Form CB when 
disseminating such documents to shareholders in Japan: (i) press release issued upon the 
170 See § 230.802(a)(3)(ii).
171 See § 230.802(a)(3)(iii).
172 The SEC generally does not impose greater dissemination requirements with respect to U.S. holders 
than are imposed by the home country jurisdiction.   For example, an issuer can satisfy its Rule 802 
dissemination requirement with respect to (i) a press release issued in Japan and posted on its 
corporate website by translating the document into English, releasing it in the U.S., and posting the 
translation on its corporate website, and (ii) documents mailed to holders in Japan by sending English 
translations of such documents either directly to U.S. shareholders or the U.S. shareholders’ standing 
agents (jonin-dairinin) in Japan.
173 See Cross Border Release, at 61,394.
69
Doing Deals in Japan.doc
execution of the merger agreement; (ii) notice of the shareholders meeting, including any 
description of the transaction and related disclosure as to the offeror’s securities; (iii) 
notice of the results of the shareholders meeting; (iv) public notice published in Japan 
announcing the results of the shareholders meeting and instructing shareholders how to 
submit shares or any similar letter of transmittal; (v) request for submission of share 
certificates in conjunction with the share exchange; and (vi) merger report made available 
at the home office and posted on the Tokyo Stock Exchange Web site following the share 
exchange.
(vi) Form CB and Form F-X Filing Deadlines
Informational documents must be furnished to the SEC on Form CB by the first 
business day after the date of publication or dissemination.174  The entity furnishing the 
Form CB must also file a Form F-X, which serves as an appointment of an agent for 
service of process in the U.S. in connection with an action by the SEC.175
174 See § 230.802(a)(3)(i).
175 By appointing an agent for service of process in the U.S., the filer agrees that the SEC may commence 
any proceeding by service of process (or notice) upon such agent.  The agent for service of process 
may be any person located in the U.S., such as a corporate services company  or an affiliate of the 
issuer.
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(vii) Legends
Any informational document distributed to U.S. holders must bear a legend as set 
forth in Rule 802(b).176  Where appropriate, informational documents disseminated to 
U.S. holders may include a further legend making clear that the document does not itself 
constitute an offering of securities in the U.S.
(3) The Cross Border Rules -  Tender Offers
Tier I and II provide limited relief from the tender offer rules for bidders seeking 
to acquire the shares of a foreign private issuer through a cash tender offer or exchange 
offer.
(i) Tier I
Tier I exempts bidders seeking to acquire the securities of a foreign private issuer 
with U.S. security holders through a tender offer177 from most of the Exchange Act tender 
offer rules, subject to certain conditions.178
176 See § 230.802(b).
177 The “tender offer” includes exchange offers.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1(b) (2004).
178 See § 240.14d-1(c).  Specifically, Tier I exempts the bidder from complying with Sections 14(d)(1) 
through 14(d)(7) of the Exchange Act, Regulation 14D and the attendant procedural, disclosure and 
dissemination  requirements, Schedule TO, Rule 14e-1 regarding the conduct of the offer, Rule 14e-2 
regarding the dissemination of the target company’s position with respect to the offer, and Rule 14e-5 
prohibiting purchases outside of the tender offer.  It should be noted that since Sections 14(d)(1) 
through 14(d)(7), Regulation 14D and Schedule TO are only applicable to transactions in which the 
target company has shares registered in the U.S., in the context of a tender offer for a Japanese 
company, the only benefit of Tier I is usually the release from Rules 14e-1, 14e-2 and 14e-5.  
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• 10% Ownership.  The Tier I exemption is only available where fewer than 
10% of the class of shares sought in the bid are held by U.S. persons, subject 
to the same conditions and exceptions as the Rule 802 10% ownership test. 179
Provided not more than 10% of the target company’s securities are held by 
U.S. holders when a bidder commences an offer, a competing offeror need not 
abide the 10% U.S. ownership requirement.180  In the case of a tender offer by 
a bidder other than an affiliate of the target company (e.g., a hostile bidder), 
the target company is deemed to be a foreign private issuer and the 10% or 
less of the shares subject to the tender offer are deemed to be owned by U.S. 
persons unless: (i) the tender offer is made pursuant to an agreement between 
the bidder and the target company; (ii) the aggregate trading volume of the 
targeted securities in the U.S. for the 12 month period ending 30 days before 
the commencement of the offer exceeds 10% of the worldwide aggregate 
trading volume of such securities over the same period; (iii) the target 
company’s annual report indicates 10% or more of the targeted securities are 
Transactions falling within the Tier I exemption are also not required to comply with the rules 
regarding going private transactions and issuer self tenders.  See §§ 240.13e-3(g)(6), 240.13e-4(h)(8).
179 See § 240.14d-1(c)(1).
180 See id.
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owned by U.S. holders; or (iv) the bidder otherwise knows 10% or more of the 
targeted securities are owned by U.S. holders.181
• Filing Requirements.  Similar to Rule 802, bidders must furnish English 
translations of the offering materials on Form CB, file a Form F-X consent to 
service, and provide U.S. security holders with the tender offer circular and 
other offering documents in English on a comparable basis to that provided to 
other security holders.182  However, bidders are only required to submit Form 
CB and Form F-X if the target company shares are registered under the 
Exchange Act or the bidder is making a self tender.183
• Equal Treatment - Cash Alternative.  Once again in keeping with the 
requirements under Rule 802, the Tier I exemption requires bidders to allow 
U.S. holders to participate in the transaction on terms at least as favorable as 
those offered to other holders and permits the bidder to offer U.S. holders a 
cash alternative where securities are part of the consideration.184  This method 
of remitting cash to U.S. holders allows bidders to include U.S holders in the 
tender offer without registering the shares in the U.S. or relying on the Rule 
181 See § 240.14d-1(c), Instruction 3.
182 See § 240.14d-1(c)(3).  
183 See § 240.14d-1(c)(3)(iii); § 240.13e-4(h)(8)(iii)(A).
184 See § 240.14d-1(c)(2)(iii).
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802 registration exemption.  Nonetheless, in the case of exchange offers 
Japanese law precludes forcing a group of shareholders to accept cash 
consideration when other shareholders are offered securities.185
(ii) Tier II
Tier II provides more limited relief to the tender offer requirements where a 
bidder makes an offer for the securities of a foreign private issuer and more than 10% but 
fewer than 40% of the securities of the target are held by U.S. persons.186  Under the Tier 
II exemption, the bidder must make filings ordinarily required by the tender offer rules 
and comply with certain procedural rules,187 but is granted leeway with respect to the 
manner in which the tender offer is conducted so as to minimize or eliminate conflicts 
with home jurisdiction law.188  There is no Form CB or F-X filing requirement for Tier II 
185 See Securities and Exchange Law, art. 27-2, para. 3.
186 See § 240.14d-1(d).
187 In particular, the bidder is required to comply with the disclosure requirements of Regulations 14D 
and 14E (and Rule 13e-3 or 13e-4 relating to going private transactions and issuer tender offers, 
respectively, if applicable) and must file a Schedule TO with the SEC and provide notice of the offer 
to the target company’s shareholders.  Moreover, since greater than 10% of the target company’s 
securities are held by U.S. persons, any securities offered as part of the consideration will not be 
exempt from registration pursuant to Rule 802.  Therefore, any such securities must be registered with 
the SEC and a prospectus must be delivered to the target company’s shareholders.
188 See § 240.14d-1(d).  Pursuant to Tier II, the bidder may make different offers to U.S. and non-U.S. 
holders provided the value of the consideration is consistent with the equal treatment principle, and 
the bidder is subject to the notice of extension and prompt payment requirements stipulated in its 
home jurisdiction tender offer rules rather than the U.S. tender offer rules.  See § 240.14d-1(d)(2)(ii)-
(iv).  
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because the rule does not exempt bidders from filing the standard tender offer disclosure 
documents.
(iii) Regulation 14E
Tender offers for the shares of a foreign private issuer with no securities 
registered under the Exchange Act, which is likely to be the case for a Japanese target 
company, need only comply with Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act189 and Regulation 
14E.  Therefore, bidders for the securities of Japanese issuers not listed in the U.S. who 
are unable to take advantage of Tier I can nonetheless comply with U.S. securities laws 
without a substantial burden.  The primary Regulation 14E requirements for bidders are 
that the offer must be kept open for 20 business days, the offer must remain open for 10 
business days following a change in the number or percentage of securities sought or the 
amount of consideration offered, and the bidder must provide notice of any extension of 
the offer to investors and promptly pay the offered consideration or return the tendered 
securities upon termination or withdrawal of the offer.190
189 Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act prohibits fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices in 
connection with tender offers.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e).
190 See § 240.14e-1(a), (b), (c), (d).  In addition, Regulation 14E prohibits the (i) trading on the basis of 
material nonpublic information relating to the tender offer during the tender offer and 
communications by the transaction parties that could result in such trading, see § 240.14e-3, (ii) 
tender of shares in which the tender offeror has a short position, see § 240.14e-4, (iii) purchase of 
securities by the offeror outside of the tender offer (subject to certain exceptions), see § 240.14e-5, 
and (iv) announcement of an offer where the offeror (a) does not anticipate commencing and 
completing the transaction within a reasonable time, (b) intends to use the announcement to 
manipulate the target company share price or (c) does not have a reasonable belief it will complete the 
transaction, see § 240.14e-8.  Moreover, Rule 14e-2 requires that within 10 business days of the 
commencement of the offer that the target company announce its position with respect to the offer.   
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(4) Emerging Issues: Application of U.S. Securities Laws to Japanese 
Rights Plans
As discussed previously, Japanese companies have reacted to the increase in 
hostile takeover activity by adopting various types of rights plans.  However, Japanese 
companies with U.S. security holders are required to comply with U.S. securities laws 
when issuing shares to U.S. persons pursuant to a rights plan.  Under a typical trust pill, 
for instance, the company issues share purchase warrants to the trust which are 
exercisable at a nominal price and are distributed to company shareholders in the event of 
a hostile takeover bid.  The Securities Act does not require warrants distributed under a 
rights plan to be registered because such issuance does not involve an “offer” or “sale.”  
However, the Securities Act requires the registration of shares issued to U.S. holders 
upon the payment of a share purchase warrant exercise price unless either an exemption 
from registration exists or the issuance of shares does not involve an offer or sale.  
Accordingly, while the issuance of Japanese rights plans does not give rise to a 
registration requirement, the possible exercise of share purchase warrants under such 
rights plans will involve issues under the U.S. securities laws that should be considered as 
part of the overall transaction in question.
In most tender offers for the securities of a Japanese company, the target publicly disseminates an 
opinion regarding the offer.
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(5) Consequences for Failure to Comply with the Cross Border Rules 
and Informational Document Liability
The Securities Act provides that an issuer must either file a registration statement 
with the SEC or comply with an exemption from registration before publicly offering 
securities in the U.S.  Therefore, if an issuer offers or sells securities in the U.S. without 
either registering such securities or complying with Rule 802 or another exemption, the 
issuer will be in violation of U.S. securities laws regardless of the number of persons to 
whom the offer is made.  
Failure to provide informational documents on Form CB or disseminate them to 
U.S. holders would constitute a failure to comply with the Rule 802 exemption.  As a 
result, the exemption would not be available to issue stock in the U.S.  The subsequent 
issuance of stock without the benefit of registration or another exemption would result in 
violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.  This violation could give rise to a civil 
enforcement action by the SEC,191 and would give U.S. investors a right of rescission 
with regard to the shares received in the exchange.192  Moreover, the SEC could seek an 
injunction from a U.S. federal district court prohibiting the issuer from including U.S. 
holders in the offer,193 and as a result of a civil enforcement action such a court could 
191 See 15 U.S.C. § 77t (1997).
192 See § 77l.
193 See § 77h-1.
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impose monetary penalties.194  Individuals found to have willfully violated Section 5 
could face additional fines and imprisonment.195  If an issuer willfully disregards U.S. 
securities laws, the likelihood and severity of fines would increase.  Bidders would face 
similar consequences for failure to comply with provisions of the Exchange Act in the 
context of a tender offer.196
If an issuer is only late in filing or disseminating a document, it is unlikely the 
SEC would take the view that the transaction does not fall within the Cross Border Rules 
unless the information not disseminated materially impaired security holders’ ability to 
make an investment decision.  Indeed, pursuant to the SEC’s recent guidelines regarding 
financial penalties, remedial steps taken by the corporation to protect investors militate 
against the assessment of fines.197
Companies that furnish informational documents to the SEC on Form CB are not 
subject to liability for false or misleading statements made within documents filed with 
the SEC pursuant to Section 18 of the Exchange Act because documents furnished on 
194 See § 77t(d)(2).  Monetary penalties range from $5,000 to $50,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary 
gain” resulting from the wrongful action for individuals and $50 to $500,000 or the “gross amount of 
pecuniary gain” resulting from the wrongful action for entities.  See id.
195 See § 77x.  Individuals found to have willfully violated the Securities Act may be fined up to $10,000 
or imprisoned for up to 5 years.
196 See 15 U.S.C. § 78u.
197 See SEC News Digest, Issue 2006-02, Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission 
Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/digest/dig010406.txt (hereinafter 
“Statement Concerning Financial Penalties”).
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Form CB are not deemed “filed.”198  Nonetheless, companies may be subject to liability 
for material misstatements or omissions contained in informational documents furnished 
on Form CB under Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, which subjects companies to 
liability for making any untrue statement of a material fact or omitting to state a material 
fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.199
Individuals and entities face significant fines, criminal penalties and private lawsuits for 
10b-5 violations.200  Liability under Rule 10b-5 requires proof of scienter as an element 
of the cause of action, which requires knowing or reckless conduct.201
198 See § 78r.
199 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  
200 10b-5 violations can give rise to civil enforcement actions by the SEC.  See § 78u (criminal 
prosecution); § 78ff (private action for damages).  In the context of a civil enforcement action by the 
SEC, individuals can be fined between $5,000 and $100,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary gain” 
resulting from the wrongful action.  See § 78u(d)(3)(B)(i).  Entities can be fined between $50,000 and 
$500,000 or the “gross amount of pecuniary gain” resulting from the wrongful action.  See § 
78u(d)(3)(B)(ii).  The SEC also has the authority to apply to enjoin any further violation of the 
Securities Act, see § 78u(d)(1), and prohibit an individual to act as a director of a company with 
securities registered under the Exchange Act, see § 78u(d)(2).  10b-5 violators could also face 
criminal prosecution, which caries a maximum penalty of $5,000,000 and 20 years in prison for 
individuals and $25,000,000 for entities.  See § 78ff(a).  Pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, where 
the SEC obtains a judgment under the securities laws or  reaches a settlement agreement for the 
disgorgement of funds and also obtains a civil judgment, the civil judgment can be added to the 
disgorgement funds held for the benefit of the victims of the securities law violation.  See 15 U.S.C. § 
7246(a) (2006).
201 See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976) (finding scienter or “a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud” a prerequisite to 10b-5 liability); Sundstrand 
Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (finding 
recklessness sufficient to create 10b-5 liability).
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To date, the SEC has not conducted a civil enforcement action in the context of a 
business combination or tender offer involving a foreign private issuer with a small 
number of U.S. holders who failed to take advantage of, or improperly utilized Rule 802 
or Tier I or II.  However, the SEC’s Statement Concerning Financial Penalties suggests 
that the SEC would impose civil penalties should it detect a foreign private issuer’s 
failure to comply with the Securities Act or the Exchange Act.  The SEC’s primary 
considerations are whether the company in question benefited from its wrongful acts and 
whether a penalty will compensate or harm injured shareholders.202  Some of the factors 
that weigh in favor of the assessment of civil penalties are intent to circumvent the law, 
the difficulty in detecting the offense which calls for “an especially high level of 
deterrence,” and the absence of remedial action and the lack of cooperation with the 
SEC.203  Moreover, the SEC and FSA recently announced terms of an agreement for 
increased cooperation and collaboration, the objectives of which are “to identify and 
discuss regulatory issues of common concern, and promote cooperation in the exchange 
of information in cross-border enforcement matters.”204  The SEC – FSA agreement 
202 See Statement Concerning Financial Penalties.
203 See id.  Similarly, the SEC’s previous guidance on the subject emphasized the importance of self-
policing, self-reporting, remediation and cooperation with the SEC.  See Report of Investigation 
Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Commission Statement on the 
Relationship of Cooperation to Agency Enforcement Decisions, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
44969, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement, Release No. 14780 (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.sec. 
gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm (commonly referred to as the “Seaboard Report”).
204 Press Release, SEC 2006-14, SEC and Japan Financial Services Agency Announce Terms for 
Increased Cooperation and Collaboration (Jan 30, 2006), http://sec.gov/news/press/2006-14.htm.
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reflects a global trend of international cooperation in securities law enforcement.205
Therefore, despite the absence of past SEC action relating to Japanese transactions, the 
current climate of international regulatory cooperation makes clear that compliance with 
U.S. securities laws should be a key concern when doing Japanese deals.
F. Additional Strategic Considerations
In addition to the aforementioned issues that should be taken into account when 
engaging in Japanese deals, there are a few other practical issues that may be helpful to 
keep in mind throughout the negotiations with a Japanese company.  Cultural differences 
are always a challenge when doing a cross-border deal, but even beyond the ubiquitous 
differences in negotiation styles and societal norms there are often certain methods and 
approaches in which successful Japanese deals are done.  In a given transaction, this may 
include some or all of the following factors.
205 See, e.g., Press Release, SEC 2004-116, Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and the “Shell” Transport 
and Trading Company, P.L.C. Pay $120 Million to Settle SEC Fraud Case Involving Massive 
Overstatement of Proved Hydrocarbon Reserves (Aug. 24, 2004), http://sec.gov/news/press/2004-
116.htm.  The SEC, the United Kingdom Financial Services Authority and the Dutch Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten jointly pursued the investigation of Shell’s overstatement, and the $120 million 
settlement was made in conjunction with a £17 million settlement with the UK FSA.  See also Press 
Release, SEC 2005-1, SEC Charges TV Azteca And Its Chairman—Ricardo Salinas Pliego—with 
Fraudulent Scheme to Conceal Salinas’ $109 Million Windfall Through Related Party Transactions
(Jan. 4, 2005), http://sec.gov/news/press/2005-1.htm (discussing the cooperation between the SEC and 
the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores in Mexico); SEC Litigation Release No. 18527, SEC 
Charges Parmalat with Financial Fraud (Dec. 30, 2003), http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18527. 
htm (discussing the cooperation between the SEC and the Italian Commissione Nazionale per la 
Società e la Borsa); and Press Release, SEC 2003-184, Commission Settles Civil Fraud Action 
Against Vivendi Universal, S.A., its Former CEO, Jean-Marie Messier, and its Former CFO, 
Guillaume Hannezo (Dec. 23, 2003), http://sec.gov/news/press/2003-184.htm (discussing the 
cooperation between the SEC and the French Autorité des Marches Financiers).
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(1) Practical Difficulties for the Hostile Deal
Although the number of hostile and contested deals in Japan has increased of late, 
it should be noted that friendly deals are still the norm.  The approximate success rate of 
hostile deals in the U.S. is 35% and in Europe is 50%.206  In Japan, however, there have 
been few instances in the past decade where a hostile acquirer has eventually succeeded 
in obtaining control of a Japanese company.207  Moreover, as more Japanese companies 
adopt rights plans and the rules on permissible defensive measures become clearer, it is 
likely that the acquirer will at some point need to enter into serious negotiations with the 
target company—the risks of going “all in” on a tender offer or proxy contest should 
probably be the gamble of last resort.
There are a number of reasons why this may be the case.  For instance, the 
acquirer will probably not have sufficient information as part of the due diligence process 
to be able to determine with confidence what its top line should be for a possible 
acquisition.  While Japanese companies provide some information in their filings with 
206 See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY REPORT, at 11.
207 In 1999, Cable & Wireless succeeded in its hostile tender offer for IDC shares despite NTT’s friendly 
tender offer.  Prior to the tender offer, Cable & Wireless was a 17.69% shareholder of IDC.  In 2000, 
Boehringer Ingelheim succeeded in its tender offer for SS Pharmaceutical shares, even though SS 
Pharmaceutical did not expressly approve the tender offer and remained silent on the issue.  
Boehringer Ingelheim was a 19.6% shareholder of SS Pharmaceutical before launching the tender 
offer.  However, note that in a recent hostile deal involving Origin Toshu Co. Ltd. (the target 
company), Don Quijote Co., Ltd. (the hostile bidder) decided to sell its shares in the target to Aeon 
Co., Ltd. (a white knight) even though Don Quijote acquired approximately 47.8% of the target shares 
through market purchases.  See The Yomiuri Shimbun, Don Quiyote, Aeon TOB Oubo Top Kaidan de 
Taio Tenkan [Don Quijote accepted Aeon’s tender offer.  It changed its approach after a senior 
management meeting], February 27, 2006, http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/atmoney/mnews/20060227 
mh06.htm (last visited on March 19, 2006).
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Japanese securities regulators, such as summaries of material contracts, the amount of 
disclosure is not as extensive as would be the case for a company that is subject to 
Exchange Act reporting requirements.208  In cases where the hostile deal may involve 
competition law issues under the Anti-Monopoly Law, it could be difficult to perform a 
market share analysis without the cooperation of the target company.  Finally, the recent 
investigations into the accounting practices of Livedoor could mean that target companies 
and their investors will react more defensively to hostile bids than would otherwise be the 
case in the absence of Livedoor’s alleged accounting fraud.209  Therefore, the preferred 
approach in Japanese deals remains to be friendly first, and then negotiate in earnest on 
those matters that the acquirer considers its vital business interests.
208 For example, it is rare to find an explanation regarding change-of-control provisions in Japanese 
securities filings.  The instructions for securities reports under the Securities and Exchange Law 
provides “if the company has entered into a material business agreement such as a lease or 
management consignment agreement of all or a material part of its business, an agreement that the 
company shares all business profits and losses with others, technical support agreements and so on, 
such agreements must be disclosed in an outline format.”  Kigyonaiyoto no Kaiji ni kansuru 
Naikakufurei [Cabinet Order regarding Disclosure of Business Contents and Others], Financial 
Ministry Order No. 5 of 1973, form 3, note (12); form 2, note (33).
209 On January 16, 2006, the Tokyo District Public Prosecutors Office began an investigation into 
Livedoor’s possible violation of the Securities and Exchange Law in connection with its M&A 
activities and allegedly fraudulent accounting practices.  In the days thereafter, Livedoor’s share price 
took a beating—dropping from a closing price of 696 yen on January 16, 2006 to a closing price of 61
yen on February 13, 2006.  On March 13, 2006, the Tokyo Stock Exchange announced Livedoor’s 
delisting.  Since the Livedoor – Fuji Television transaction is regarded as a symbol of the hostile deal,
with the former Livedoor CEO Takefumi Horie as the pubic face of the hostile acquirer, future 
acquirers of Japanese companies should carefully consider whether such a climate will be conducive 
to certain offensive M&A strategies.
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(2) Obtaining “Corporate Value” in the Acquisition
The Defensive Measures Guidelines provide that “defensive measures should be 
adopted, activated and cancelled for purposes to secure and increase corporate value, and 
in turn work to the shareholders’ common benefit.”210  Furthermore, the Corporate Value 
Study Report notes that an acquisition proposal which will increase corporate value 
should not be excluded.211 The concern over better understanding and assessing 
“corporate value” is an issue that an acquirer will probably confront in some manner 
when negotiating a Japanese deal.  In this regard, it should be noted that corporate value 
does not necessarily mean only the temporal interests of the company shareholders, but 
also the long-term effects that a possible acquisition could have on the company.  The 
Defensive Measures Guidelines define corporate value as “a company’s attributes and the 
degree thereto that contribute to the shareholders’ benefit such as the company’s assets, 
profitability, stability, efficiency, growth potential and so forth .”212 Such a principle is 
not foreign to Delaware takeovers jurisprudence.213  Accordingly, the acquirer would 
serve itself well by appreciating the importance of obtaining corporate value in order to 
achieve a successful Japanese deal.
210 See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 3.
211 See THE CORPORATE VALUE STUDY REPORT, at 83.
212 See THE DEFENSIVE MEASURES GUIDELINES, at 2.
213
“[T]he directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine that the market 
undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers that do not reflect the long term value 
of the corporation under its present management plan.”  Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp., 651 
A.2d 1361, 1376 (Del. 1995).
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(3) Defining the Acquisition Proposal
As mentioned in the discussion of the Yumeshin – JEC deal, a Japanese target 
company will probably require that an acquirer provide sufficient information on its 
proposed acquisition.  From the perspective of the target, such information is necessary in 
order to evaluate the potential impact of the proposed acquisition on corporate value.  
Thus, an acquirer should anticipate that the process of completing such procedures may 
take more time than it is accustomed to when compared to similar transactions in the 
United States.  Furthermore, there is the likelihood that the target company will respond 
to an unsolicited acquirer by noting that any information provided by such acquirer is 
insufficient.  In the Yumeshin – JEC deal, JEC insisted that Yumeshin announced its 
tender offer without providing JEC with sufficient information.214  As you may recall, 
however, the Tokyo District Court suggested that JEC could have obtained the necessary 
information by responding to Yumeshin’s proposal of a business alliance.215 The 
acquirer, therefore, should use its best efforts to provide as much information as possible 
in such situations, and be open to negotiations with the target company.
214 See JEC, TOSHA KABUSHIKI NI TAISURU KOKAIKAITSUKE KETSUGI HE NO TAIO NI TSUITE [Re: 
Reaction to Resolution of Tender Offer for Shares of the Company], 1 (July 11, 2005), available at
http://www.jecc.co.jp/topics/kaituke_3.pdf (last visited Mar. 7, 2006).
215 See supra note 49.
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IV. Conclusion
The current Japanese M&A market presents opportunities for U.S. companies and 
their advisors that are arguably the most promising in recent history.  Perhaps an 
important observation to keep in mind, however, is that Japanese M&A is experiencing 
historic changes for which the full effects will probably only be completely appreciated 
in hindsight.  While one can note the changes on a play-by- play basis, the ultimate 
outcomes of various transactions, tender offers, and proxy contests can only be known 
with certainty after their completion.  To draw a parallel to the U.S. experience with 
takeovers, Japan in 2006 may well be like Delaware in 1985 shortly before the Delaware 
Supreme Court issued its historic rulings in Moran,216 Unocal and Revlon.  Thus, in 
Japan much has happened, but more is likely coming.  With this in mind, given the 
challenges posed by the opportunities in the Japanese M&A market, the importance of 
well informed and considered decision-making will be essential in order to ensure that 
U.S. companies compete and succeed in doing Japanese deals.
216 Moran v. Household Int’l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
